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INTRODUCTION
The current municipal securities market does not resemble its reputation as a
"sleepy market."I In 2010, there was nearly $500 billion of municipal securities
issued,2 with an additional $3.35 trillion traded through secondary market
* City University of New York (CUNY) School of Law, J.D., 2012; Binghamton University, State University
of New York (SUNY), B.S., 2006. This Article was only possible because of the guidance and suggestions of
Professor Michael C. Macchiarola. Your enthusiasm for thinking critically about today's public interest
issues is a real asset to CUNY School of Law. The Author would also like to thank Professor Natalie M.
Gomez-Velez for her comments and shared appreciation of the Chevron two-step. In addition, the entire staff
at the CUNY School of Law Library must be acknowledged for helping the Author complete the research in
this Article. And, of course, the Author must thank his fianc6, Kara Grippen, for pretending to listen when he
stressed to her the importance of regulation in the municipal bond market. Finally, the Author thanks the staff
on the Journal of Legislation for their tremendous efforts in reviewing and editing this Article.
1. The municipal securities market is still routinely referred to as a "sleepy market." See, e.g., Nelson
D. Schwartz, A Seer on Banks Raises a Furor on Bonds, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 7, 2011, http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/02/08/business/economy/08whitney.htmi.
2. Statistics for 2010 show that there was $433.27 billion in long-term municipal bond issuances and
$66.32 billion in short-term municipal note issuances. BOND BUYER, THE BOND BUYER'S 2010 IN
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transactions. 3 Due in part to the creation of Build America Bonds,4 the municipal
securities market is as large as it has ever been with nearly $3 trillion in securities
outstanding.5  Moreover, a market once characterized by its simplicity and
homogeneity now involves complex variable rate reset securities and sophisticated
derivative instruments.6  Even more startlingly, retail investors now comprise
nearly 70% of municipal securities investors.7
In addition, the integrity of this market has never been more important.
Traditionally, state and local governments have relied on municipal securities as a
low-cost capital to implement important public interest projects.8 In 2010 alone,
the market raised over $210 billion for projects related to education, healthcare, and
transportation. 9  Increasingly though, state and local governments are relying on
these securities to plug budget shortfalls.' 0  Consequently, this market is closely
intertwined with the ability of state and local governments to satisfy labor costs,
and meet long-term healthcare and public pension obligations.I'
Therefore, considering these developments, it is particularly alarming that
industry analysts forecast that the municipal securities market is likely to
experience an unprecedented increase in defaults. The most prominent critic has
STATISTICS 3A (2011) [hereinafter BOND BUYER 2010 STATISTICS], available at
http://www.bondbuyer.com/pdfs/2010yrend.pdf.
3. SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKT. Ass'N, MUNICIPAL BOND CREDIT REPORT: FOURTH QUARTER AND FULL
YEAR 2010, at 14 (2011), available at http://www.sifma.org/research/item.aspx?id=23188.
4. Build America Bonds ("BABs") were created through the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). BABs were
taxable municipal bonds in which the federal government provided municipal securities issuers with a "direct
interest subsidy or a comparable tax credit." BOND BUYER 2010 STATISTICS, supra note 2, at 2A. The
program existed for twenty-two months and ended when it was allowed to expire at year's end in December
2010. Id. For a more detailed description of the program, see id. at 2A, 17A.
5. In 2010, there was approximately $2.99 trillion of municipal securities outstanding. Bond Buyer,
Holders of Municipal Debt 2001-2010, (2011), available at
http://www.bondbuyer.com/marketstatistics/#QuarterlyTables. For a brief discussion of other government-
sponsored programs that contributed to the recent increase in municipal securities issuances, see Patrick
Temple-West, PABs See Ist Jump in 3 Years, BOND BUYER, July 19, 2011,
http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/120 137/private-activity-bond-issuance-1029057-1.html.
6. For an analysis of the shift towards more complex and sophisticated practices in the municipal
securities market, see W. Bartley Hildreth & C. Kurt Zorn, The Evolution of the State and Local Government
Municipal Debt Market over the Past Quarter Century, PUB. BUDGETING & FIN., Dec. 2005. For an overview
of the collapse of the auction rate municipal securities market, see Michael C. Macchiarola, Beware of Risk
Everywhere: An Important Lesson from the Current Credit Crisis, 5 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 267, 303-07 (2009).
7. Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkt. Ass'n, Holders of U.S. Municipal Securities (June 13, 2011), available at
http://www.sifma.org/research/statistics.aspx. The composition of municipal securities investors has shifted
from predominantly institutional investors to predominantly retail investors. Hildreth & Zorn, supra note 6, at
130-32; see also JUDY WESALO TEMEL, BOND MKT. ASS'N, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF MUNICIPAL BONDS 150
tbl.6.1 (5th ed. 2001). Retail investors include individual "household" investors and small organizations.
MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD., GLOSSARY OF MUNICIPAL SECURITIES TERMS, Retail Customer (2d. ed. 2004)
[hereinafter MSRB GLOSSARY], available at http://emma.msrb.org/EducationCenter/Glossary.aspx.
Whereas, institutional investors include pension funds, hedge funds, banks, and insurance companies. JOHN
C. COFFEE, JR. & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES REGULATION 41 (1 Ith ed. 2009).
8. See infra Part 1.
9. BOND BUYER 2010 STATISTICS, supra note 2, at 3A.
10. E.g., Tami Luhby, States Go Deeper into Debt, CNNMONEY (July 30, 2010), http://
money.cnn.com/2010/07/30/news/economy/state debt levels/index.htm.
11. See infra Part Ill.
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been Meredith Whitney.12  Her investment advisory firm produced a scathing
industry report13 and she appeared on CBS's 60 Minutes where she set off a
firestorm by forecasting "50 to 100 sizable defaults" totaling "hundreds of billions
of dollars."' 4  Legendary investor Warren Buffett, who is himself invested in
municipal bond insurance, has also predictedlarge-scale defaults. These concerns
have prompted Congress to flirt with allowing states to declare bankruptcy.16 Now,
the municipal securities industry is again on edge after the recent bankruptcy filings
by Harrisburg, Pennsylvania and Jefferson County, Alabama.17
All this recent attention on a supposedly "sleepy market" begs the question of
whether the municipal securities regulatory regime remains adequate. This Article
answers this question by focusing on the Tower Amendment, a statute enacted in
1975 that broadly limits regulation in the municipal securities market. Largely as a
12. Meredith Whitney gained prominence by correctly forecasting Citigroup's financial troubles in
2008. For some background on Meredith Whitney, see Michael Lewis, The Rise and Rise ofAnalyst Meredith
Whitney, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 9, 2008), http://www.bloonberg.com/apps/news?pid=
newsarchive&sidaSApdA59SFok.
13. MEREDITH WHITNEY ADVISORY GRP., TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS: LAUNCHING RATINGS ON THE
TOP 15 STATES (2010). For a brief overview of the report, see Shawn Tully, Meredith Whitney's New Target:
The States, FORTUNE (Sept. 28, 2010), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2010/09/28/meredith-whitneys-new-
target-the-states.
14. CBSNEWS, State Budgets: The Day of Reckoning, CBSNEWS 60 MINUTES (Dec. 19, 2010),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/12/19/60minutes/main7166220.shtml?tag-contentMain; CBS News 60
Minutes: State Budgets: Day of Reckoning (CBS television broadcast Dec. 19, 2010), available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id-7166293n&tag-contentMain;contentBody.
Meredith Whitney will again ganer attention in November 2012 when she is expected to release a book that
makes similar arguments regarding the likelihood of defaults in the municipal securities market. See Kevin
Roose, Meredith Whitney Lands Book Deal, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Feb. 21, 2012, 6:10 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/21/meredith-whitney-lands-book-deal/.
15. Tom Petruno, Buffett Warns (Again) on Muni Bond Risks, but What's Your Time Horizon?, Los
ANGELES TIMES: MONEY & COMPANY BLOG (June 2, 2010, 6:14 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/
money co/2010/06/warren-buffett-muni-bonds-warning-terrible-problem-angelides-moodys-fcic.html.
16. See Mary Williams Walsh, A Path Is Sought for States to Escape Their Debt Burdens, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 20, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/21/business/economy/21bankruptcy.html? r-I (indicating
that only local govemments can currently file for bankruptcy protection).
17. See Taylor Riggs, Jef]Co Filing Shouldn't Prompt Copy Cats, BOND BUYER, Nov. 11, 2011,
http://www.bondbuyer.com/news/jefferson-county-alabama-1033079-I.html; James Ramage, How Will Retail
React to JeffCo Bankruptcy?, BOND BUYER, Nov. 10, 2011, http://www.bondbuyer.com/ news/jefferson-
county-bankruptcy-retail-analysis-1033041-1.html. For a discussion of the recent bankruptcy filings by
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania and Jefferson County, Alabama, see Campbell Robertson, Mary Williams Walsh &
Michael Cooper, Bankruptcy Rarely Offers Easy Answer for Counties, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 10, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/11/us/bankruptcy-rarely-offers-easy-answer-for-counties.html. Forupdated
information on the status of these bankruptcy filings, see Harrisburg Financial Crisis, PATRIOT-NEWS,
http://www.pennlive.com/harrisburg-debt/index.ssf/index.html (last visited June 23, 2012) and Jefferson
County Alabama Bankruptcy, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, http://www.al.com/jeffco (last visited June 23, 2012).
As this Article went into publication, the cities of Stockton, California and San Bernardino, California were
also filing for bankruptcy protection. Erica E. Phillips, San Bernardino Files for Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 2, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443866404577564922008926122. html;
Bobby White, Stockton Files for Bankruptcy Protection, WALL ST. J., June 29, 2012,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304058404577495412282335228.html. Stockton, California
is being described as "the largest city to file for bankruptcy in U.S. history" because it has a population of
nearly 300,000 people. See Jim Christie, Stockton, Cahfornia Files for Bankruptcy, REUTERS (June 28, 2012,
11:49 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/29/us-stockton-bankruptcy-idUSBRE85SO5120120629.
18. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15B(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(d) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
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result of the Tower Amendment, a unique regulatory regime has evolved that does
not regulate the issuers of municipal securities. Instead, the "backdoor" regime
regulates the brokers, dealers, and underwriters who typically interact with the
issuers. 19  The question of the adequacy of this regime has taken on additional
importance as the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") has grown
increasingly vocal about its desire to repeal the Tower Amendment in order to
implement an issuer-based regulatory regime.20 Moreover, a provision in the recent
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ("Dodd-Frank Act")
mandated that the United States Government Accountability Office issue a report in
July 2012 advising whether the Tower Amendment should be repealed.21
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I overviews the unique characteristics
of municipal securities, in an effort to provide relevant background information on
the market's operations. Part II outlines the existing municipal securities regulatory
regime, focusing most closely on the disclosure requirements and the regulatory
impediments created by the Tower Amendment. Part III examines the regulatory
inadequacies in the municipal securities market and makes the case that these
inadequacies are largely the result of sparse regulatory enforcement. Part IV
argues, though, that if the existing regulatory regime were enforced in court, then
the Tower Amendment would likely render a significant aspect of the current
19. See infra Part II.
20. See Luis A. Aguilar, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Speech by SEC Commissioner:
Improving Municipal Securities Disclosure: Our Work Is Not Yet Done (May 26, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch0526IOlaa-municipal.htm; Andrew Ackerman, SEC Looks to
Target Tower Amendment, BOND BUYER, May 13, 2009, http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/1 18_91/-303354-
1.html; Mary Williams Walsh, Ex-ChiefofS.E.C. Says Pension Funds in Danger, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/31/business/31sec.html?pagewanted-print; Lynn Hume, SEC's New Muni
Initiative, BOND BUYER, Mar. 6, 2007, http://www.bondbuyer.com/news/-266335-1.html.
One of the most vocal critics of the Tower Amendment is SEC Commissioner Elisse B. Walter. She has
pointedly stated:
I believe that the exemptions for municipal securities should be removed . . . and the Tower
Amendment should be repealed.
. . . [Aippropriate legislative change would allow the [SEC] to take important steps to
improve the quality and availability of municipal issuer information to investors.
. . . [Tlhe [SEC] could [then] require that municipal issuers make available to investors
offering documents and periodic reports that contain information similar, although not
identical, to that required of issuers and offerings of corporate securities.
Elisse B. Walter, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Speech by SEC Commissioner: Regulation of the
Municipal Securities Market: Investors Are Not Second-Class Citizens (Oct. 28, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spchI02809ebw.htm.
As this Article went into publication, the SEC released a report tempering its support for repealing the Tower
Amendment. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT ON THE MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKET 134-35
(2012) [hereinafter SEC 2012 MUNICIPAL SECURITIES REPORT], available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/munireport073112.pdf.
21. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §
976(b)(5), (c), 124 Stat. 1376, 1924. The report was issued as this Article went into publication. See U.S.
GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-698, MUNICIPAL SECURITIES: OPTIONS FOR IMPROVING
CONTINUING DISCLOSURE (2012) [hereinafter GAO MUNICIPAL SECURITIES REPORT], available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592669.pdf. The report is inconclusive regarding whether to maintain or
repeal the Tower Amendment. See id. at 22-25.
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regulatory regime invalid. Finally, Part V proposes some specific regulatory
improvements in response to this Article's main contention that the existing state of
municipal securities regulation is grossly unacceptable.
I. MARKET OVERVIEW
Municipal securities22 are unique debt instruments issued by state and local
government units.23 Municipal securities operate like a loan24 because they
represent a promise by the issuer to repay investors a stipulated amount of
borrowed money, called the principal amount,25 along with interest according to a
fixed schedule.26  Typically, municipal securities pay the investor predetermined
interest-only payments until the security matures, at which point the issuer repays
the investor the principal amount.27 In practice, investors often purchase municipal
securities at a market rate price that differs from the security's principal amount. 28
This Part provides only a brief overview of the municipal securities market by
summarizing three important market idiosyncrasies.29 First, this Part outlines why
issuers and investors participate in this market. Second, this Part characterizes
some of the different types of municipal securities. Finally, this Part describes the
unique role underwriters and financial advisors play in bringing municipal
securities to market.
Municipal securities provide state or local governments with a source of low-
22. The term "security" is legally detined and includes investments such as bonds and notes. See
Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2006); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(10),
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (2006). Generally, a security is "an instrument evidencing debt of or equity in a
common enterprise in which an investment is made on the expectation of financial gain." MSRB GLOSSARY,
supra note 7, Security. For additional analysis on the definition of a security, see Michael C. Macchiarola,
Securities Linked to the Performance of Tiger Woods? Not Such a Long Shot, 42 CREIGHTON L. REV. 29,44-
51(2008).
23. Municipal securities can be issued directly by state or local governments, or through related
authorities or agencies. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(29), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(29) (2006 & Supp.
IV 2010). Interestingly, municipal securities also include debt issued by "the District of Columbia, Puerto
Rico, the Virgin Islands, or any other possession of the United States." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(16) (defining the
term "State"); id. §78c(a)(29) (defining municipal securities as "direct obligations of . . . a State"). The
critical distinction is that municipal securities do not include debt issued by the United States Treasury and
other federal agencies. Compare id. §78c(a)(29) (defining "municipal securities"), with id. § 78c(a)(42)
(defining "government securities").
24. Bonds are often analogized to loans. See, e.g., ANNETTE THAU, THE BOND BOOK 3 (3d ed. 2010);
What is a Bond?, FIDELITY INVS., http://www.fidelity.com/leaming-center/fixed-income-bonds/what-is-a-
bond (last visited Aug. 6, 2012).
25. The principal amount is sometimes referred to as the "par value" or "face amount." MSRB
GLOSSARY, supra note 7, Par Value.
26. TEMEL, supra note 7, at 1.
27. FIDELITY INVS., supra note 24. A municipal security matures at the date the principal amount
becomes due and payable to the investor. MSRB GLOSSARY, supra note 7, Maturity. A municipal security
that includes a redemption provision can become due and payable prior to the maturity date. For a brief
overview of redemption provisions, see TEMEL, supra note 7, at 128-30.
28. The market rate price for a municipal security is influenced by interest rate risk and default risk. See
THAU, supra note 24, at 25-50. For a discussion of these risks, see infra notes 42, 138 and accompanying
text. For a brief overview of how municipal bonds are priced and quoted, see TEMEL, supra note 7, at 21-26.
29. TEMEL, supra note 7, is an excellent book on the municipal securities market.
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cost capital because investors typically accept a relatively low rate of return when
purchasing these securities. Investors are willing to accept a relatively low rate of
return for two primary reasons. First, municipal securities have historically been
low-risk investments because governments have reliable revenue sources for
repayment. 30  Second, the interest income received from municipal securities is
frequently exempt from the investor's federal and state income tax obligations.31
The federal income tax exemption applies so long as the security is issued by a state
or local government unit to fund a permissible public interest purpose.32 In
addition, most states provide a similar state income tax exemption to in-state
investors. 33  These tax exemptions are significant because they distinguish this
market from the securities markets in which income is taxable. 34 Thus, these tax
exemptions act as a subsidy to municipal securities issuers because investors
relieved from an income tax burden will accept a lower rate of return relative to an
investment where they would have to pay income tax.35 Recently, there has been
30. In theory, an investment's risk should correlate with the rate of return it offers. See COFFEE, JR. &
SALE, supra note 7, at 8-9. For a report articulating the historical low-risk in municipal securities, see
MOODY'S INVESTORS SERv., U.S. MUNICIPAL BOND DEFAULTS AND RECOVERIES, 1970-2009 (2010)
[hereinafter MOODY'S DEFAULT REPORT], available at http://v2.moodys.com/cust/content/
Content.ashx?source=StaticContent/Free%20Pages/Regulatory/20Affairs/Documents/us municipal bond d
efaults and recoveries 02_10.pdf.
31. "Triple exemption" bonds are exempt from municipal, local income or other special taxes, in
addition to being exempt from federal and state income tax. MSRB GLOSSARY, supra note 7, Tax-Exempt
Bond.
32. Section 103 of the Internal Revenue Code, which is entitled "Interest on State and local bonds,"
provides:
(a) Exclusion
Except as provided in subsection (b), gross income does not include interest on any State or local
bond.
(b) Exceptions
Subsection (a) shall not apply to-
(1) Private activity bond ....
(2) Arbitrage bond ....
I.R.C. § 103 (2006).
A private activity bond exists if the proceeds of a municipal securities issuance are used by one or more
private entities. MSRB GLOSSARY, supra note 7, Private Activity Bond; see also I.R.C. § 141 (2006)
(outlining the exact conditions for qualifying as a private activity bond). An arbitrage bond exists if a tax-
exempt municipal securities issuance creates profit for the issuer because the proceeds are immediately
invested in higher earning taxable securities. See MSRB GLOSSARY, supra note 7, Arbitrage; IR.C. § 148
(2006) (outlining the exact conditions for qualifying as an arbitrage bond). For additional discussion of
municipal securities and the federal income tax exemption, see TEMEL, supra note 7, at 210-14.
33. Most states have a state income tax exemption that applies only to the income earned on securities
issued by that state and not towards the income earned on securities issued by other states. See What Are
Bonds: Tax Treatment of Bonds: State Tax Treatment, MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD. (expand section entitled
"Tax Treatment of Bonds"), http://emma.msrb.org/EducationCenter/WhatAreBonds.aspx (last visited June 23,
20i2). For an overview of each state's income tax exemption policy, see Bond Buyer, State Tax Treatment of
Municipal Bonds: 2010, (2011), available at http://www.bondbuyer.com/marketstatistics/treat and TEMEL,
supra note 7, at 30-31 tbl.2.1.
34. TEMEL, supra note 7, at 27 ("The principal characteristic that has traditionally set municipal
securities apart from all other capital market securities is the federal tax exemption.").
35. A study found Canadian provincial and municipal governments, which must borrow in an
exclusively taxable market, are subject to significantly higher borrowing rates relative to their American
242 [Vol. 38:2
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some support on both sides of the political aisle to reduce or even eliminate the
federal income tax exemption provided to most municipal securities. 36  Clearly,
these proposals would have a significant impact on the municipal securities market
because reducing this tax exemption would likely decrease investment and increase
issuer borrowing costs.37
Municipal securities can be characterized in many different ways.38 This Part
examines three of the most significant classifications. First, municipal securities
can be issued with different maturities. 39  A common industry distinction
characterizes municipal "notes" as having a maturity of one year or less, and
municipal "bonds" as having a maturity greater than one year.40  Second, the
interest rate used to calculate the investor's interest payments can be either a
predetermined fixed rate or a variable rate that adjusts based on market
conditions.41 This is a significant factor because fluctuation in interest rates will
affect whether a fixed rate municipal bond is more favorable to the issuer or the
investor.42 Third, the government issuer's source of repayment can vary. The most
basic distinction is between "general obligation bonds" and "revenue bonds."
Repayment on general obligation bonds is made from the issuer's general tax
revenue; thus, repayment is guaranteed only by that issuer's full faith and credit.43
Repayment on revenue bonds is made from and guaranteed only by a specific fund
or source.44
Lastly, underwriters and financial advisors play a unique role in bringing
municipal securities to market. An underwriter acts as an intermediary between the
counterparts. Hildreth & Zorn, supra note 6, at 153. Moreover, before 1913, when neither municipal
securities nor corporate bonds were subject to federal income taxation, the interest rates on these securities
were about the same. TEMEL, supra note 7, at 27. After 1913, the rate on tax-exempt municipal securities fell
sharply relative to corporate bonds, which then became subject to federal income taxation. Id.
36. See, e.g., Lynn Hume & Patrick Temple-West, Obama Bill Would Restrict Use of Tax-Exempt
Interest, BOND BUYER, Sept. 12, 2011, http://www.bondbuyer.com/news/-1030977-1.html; Patrick Temple-
West, Hands Off Our Tax-Exemption!, BOND BUYER, Sept. 9, 2011, http://www.bondbuyer.com/
issues/ 20_174/tax-exempt-muni-exemption-1 030877-1.html; Jason Zweig, How Long Will the Tax Break on
Municipal Bonds Last?, WALL ST. J., May 7, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SBl0001424052748704810504576307233579693982.html?mod=WSJ hppMIDDLE Video Top.
37. See Hume & Temple-West, supra note 36.
38. For example, this Part does not discuss that municipal securities can be classified according to
maturity structure, issuer, price, rating, or purpose of financing. For an overview of different classifications
and characterizations, see MSRB GLOSSARY, supra note 7, Bond, Note.
39. The "maturity" date is the date when the principal amount of the municipal security becomes due
and payable. TEMEL, supra note 7, at 248.
40. MSRB GLOSSARY, supra note 7, Bond, Note. But cf, TEMEL, supra note 7, at 21, 34 (noting that
short-term municipal notes usually have a maturity of thirteen months or less).
41. The term "coupon" is often used to describe a municipal bond's interest rate because historically a
detachable paper coupon evidenced that the investor was owed an interest payment. MSRB GLOSSARY, supra
note 7, Coupon.
42. When interest rates change, a fixed rate investor may be receiving interest payments at a rate below
or above where the market would currently pay. This dilemma is called "interest rate risk." See THAU, supra
note 24, at 29-36.
43. See TEMEL, supra note 7, at 33. An example of a general obligation bond would be a city that issues
a bond and guarantees repayment from its general collection of property taxes.
44. See id. An example of a revenue bond would be a transportation agency that issues a bond to build a
bridge and guarantees repayment from the bridge's toll collections.
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issuer and investors in an initial offering of securities.4 5 Typically, a syndicate of
underwriters purchases the securities directly from the issuer and then quickly sells
these securities to solicited investors.46 The issuer pays the underwriter a fee that is
determined according to the terms of the particular sale arrangement employed. 47
An underwriter assumes some risk because, in certain circumstances, it can be left
owning the issuance's unsold securities. 48  The municipal securities market is
unique in that the underwriters are subject to disclosure regulation. 49
In addition, municipal securities issuers often employ a financial advisor to
provide counseling services in structuring the securities issuance.50  In theory, the
financial advisor should provide trusted counseling because, unlike the underwriter,
the financial advisor is not directly exposed to the issuance's financial risks and
rewards.5 1 The financial advisor's expertise might include analyzing the issuer's
45. See TEMEL, supra note 7, at 256. The federal securities laws provide three ways to qualify as an
underwriter: purchasing from the issuer with a view towards distribution, direct or indirect participation in an
underwriting effort, and selling securities on behalf of a control person. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF
SECURITIES REGULATION § 4.27, at 211 (6th ed. 2009); see also Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(1 1), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77b(a)( 11) (2006) (defining underwriter); Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a)(20), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-
2(a)(20) (2006) (defining underwriter).
46. This type of underwriting arrangement is called a "firm-commitment underwriting." For a
description of different underwriting arrangements, see HAZEN, supra note 45, § 2.1[2], at 68-71.
47. Generally, there are two types of sale arrangements in the municipal securities market. TEMEL,
supra note 7, at 7. In a "competitive sale" the issuer determines the terms of the issuance in advance and then
selects the underwriter that bids for the job promising to get the lowest interest rate. Id. In a "negotiated sale"
the issuer selects the underwriter, and then together they determine the terms of the issuance. Id. A
negotiated sale is often used where gauging investors' interest is more difficult because the security being
issued is more complex or risky. Id. at 64.
The use of negotiated sales is becoming increasingly popular. See Bond Buyer, Annual Municipal Debt
Sales: Long-Term Bonds: Dollar Amounts, (2012), available at
http://www.bondbuyer.com/marketstatistics/search amdt.html. One commentator argues that the increasing
preference for negotiated sales assures "pay-to-play" fraud is more likely to flourish because in a negotiated
sale the issuer gets to select the underwriter with less transparency and no public bidding process. Rep.
Spencer T. Bachus, Federal Policy Responses to the Predicament of Municipal Finance, 40 CUMB. L. REV.
759, 771-73 (2010). In a "pay-to-play" scheme, a politician steers government business to a particular
underwriter in exchange for campaign donations or personal benefits. MSRB GLOSSARY, supra note 7, Pay-
to-Play. The recent bankruptcy of Jefferson County, Alabama involves pay-to-play corruption and negotiated
sales. See Shaila Dewan, Birmingham Mayor Convicted on All Counts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2009, at A19,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/29/us/29birmingham.html.
48. Whether a particular underwriter might be left owning the issuance's unsold securities depends upon
the type of underwriting arrangement that is employed. See HAZEN, supra note 45, § 2.1[2], at 68-71.
49. For a discussion of the regulatory demands placed upon underwriters in the municipal securities
market, see infra Part II. Generally, a municipal securities underwriter incurs continuing regulatory
obligations that exist until the security's maturity; whereas, the regulatory obligations of most corporate
securities underwriters relate almost entirely to the initial offering. See infra Part II.
50. A financial advisory relationship exists "when a broker, dealer, or municipal securities dealer
renders or enters into an agreement to render financial advisory or consultant services to or on behalf of an
issuer with respect to a [municipal securities issuance]." MSRB Activities of Fin. Advisors, Mun. Sec.
Rulemaking Bd. Rule G-23(b) (2011). Some commentators suggest "[s]ignificantly more and more issuers of
municipal bonds use the services of financial advisors during the bond issuance process." Kenneth N. Daniels
& Jayaraman Vijayakumar, The Role and Impact ofFinancial Advisors in the Market for Municipal Bonds, 30
J. FIN. SERVS. RES. 43, 43 (2006).
51. Some commentators strongly suggest that financial advisors help municipal securities issuers
achieve more favorable financial terms in their issuance of securities. Id. at 44-45 ("Our results show that
using financial advisors results in significantly lower . . . underwriter [fees] for revenue issues.... Our results
also show that using financial advisors reduces underwriter [fees] significantly for revenue and [general
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financing needs, advising the issuer on its overall financing plan, or even assisting
the issuer in the selection of the underwriter.52 Many financial institutions provide
both underwriting services and financial advisory services. 53  However, there has
been a regulatory effort to curtail issuances in which the same financial institution
acts as underwriter and financial advisor. 54  Unfortunately, despite these efforts,
there continues to be concerns that issuances exist in which there is a conflict of
interest between these distinct roles.55 The recent passage of the Dodd-Frank Act
should significantly impact the relationship between the financial advisor and issuer
by imposing a fiduciary duty on the financial advisor. As a result, the role of the
financial advisor should be of increasing importance in the municipal securities
market.
This Part provides only a basic overview of the municipal securities market's
unique characteristics, but this overview is sufficient for understanding the rest of
this Article.
II. REGULATORY REGIME
The municipal securities regulatory regime is unquestionably unique. Since
issuers are comprised almost entirely of nonfederal governments, there has been
strong resistance to federal regulation. As a result, the regulatory regime has
evolved slowly and typically only in response to significant investor setbacks.5 7 An
obstacle to enacting municipal securities regulation is the Tower Amendment. 8
Enacted in 1975, this statutory provision broadly restricts securities regulators from
implementing "issuer-based regulation" in the municipal securities market. 59
obligation] issues that are not [competitive sales].").
52. TEMEL, supra note 7, at I1. Other important services provided by the financial advisor include
working with the rating agencies and credit enhancers. Id. The rating agencies provide evaluations of the
credit quality of municipal securities. MSRB GLOSSARY, supra note 7, Ratings. Ratings are intended to
measure the probability of the issuer's timely repayment to investors. Id. Ratings are often assigned upon
issuance and are periodically reviewed. Id. Credit enhancers are third parties that help increase the credit
quality of a municipal securities issuance. MSRB GLOSSARY, supra note 7, Credit Enhancement. This
includes providing bond insurance, bank letters of credit, or government related guarantees. Id.
53. In 2010, these financial institutions were market leaders in various municipal securities categories
for both underwriting and financial advisory services: RBC Capital Markets (All Issues), Goldman Sachs
(Transportation Bonds), Barclays Capital (Electric Power Bonds), Piper Jaffray & Co. (Small Issues),
Raymond James (Housing Bonds). See BOND BUYER 2010 STATISTICS, supra note 2, at 9A, 11 A, 12A, 15A;
MSRB GLOSSARY, supra note 7, Senior Manager.
54. See Mun. Sec. Rulemaking Bd. Rule G-23; Lynn Hume, MSRB Files Amended G-23 to Bar Dealer-
FAs From Serving as Underwriters in Same Transaction, BOND BUYER, Feb. 9, 2011,
http://www.bondbuyer.com/news/-1023084-I.html (discussing proposed amendments to MSRB Rule G-23).
55. See Joan Quiqley, G-23 Changes May Have Loopholes, FAs Warn, BOND BUYER, Mar. 23, 2011, at
1, available at http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/120 56/g_23 changes loopholes- 1024703-I.html.
56. See infra p. 20 and accompanying notes.
57. Regulation in the municipal securities market is widely criticized for being developed only in
response to a market crisis. See, e.g., Theresa A. Gabaldon, Financial Federalism and the Short, Happy Life
ofMunicipal Securities Regulation, 34 J. CORP. L. 739, 742 (2009) ("[M]unicipal securities regulation is a tale
of call and response between municipal financial fiasco and federal regulation reaction.").
58. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15B(d), 15 U.S.C. § 780-4(d) (2006 & Supp. Iv 2010).
59. "Issuer-based regulation" refers to a regulatory regime akin to corporate securities regulation where
most issuers are responsible for registering securities and producing timely disclosure. For a brief overview
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Consequently, the regulatory regime involves primarily "backdoor" regulation.60
This term describes regulation that is not imposed directly on the issuer of the
security, but is instead imposed indirectly through the "backdoor" against the
brokers, dealers, and underwriters that interact with the issuer of the security.61
This "backdoor" regulatory approach has led to an assortment of regulators having
jurisdiction in the municipal securities market. Regulators in the municipal
securities market include the SEC, 62 the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board
("MSRB"), 63  the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ("FINRA"), 64  and
various bank regulating agencies. 65
of the corporate securities disclosure regime, see COFFEE, JR. & SALE, supra note 7, at 93-95.
60. The phrase "backdoor" regulation is commonly used in the securities industry. See, e.g., id. at 16-
17.
61. Broker, dealer, and broker-dealer are the most general terms for persons or firms acting as
intermediaries in securities transactions. A broker is a person or firm engaged in the business of buying and
selling securities for others. E.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (2006)
(defining broker). A dealer is a person or firm engaged in the business of buying and selling securities
through their own account. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5) (defining dealer). A broker-dealer is typically a firm
that is engaged in both these activities. MSRB GLOSSARY, supra note 7, Broker-Dealer. An underwriter is a
specific type of dealer or broker-dealer. See TEMEL, supra note 7, at 256. An underwriter acts as an
intermediary between the issuer and investors in an initial offering of securities. See supra p. 8 and
accompanying notes. In that process, the underwriter purchases the securities from the issuer through its
"own account" and then sells the securities to solicited investors. See supra p. 8 and accompanying notes.
62. What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited
June 6, 2011), overviews that the SEC was established in 1934 and that it is the most prominent regulator in
the United States securities markets. See also Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 4-4E, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78d-
78d-5 (Supp. IV 2010). The SEC's involvement in municipal securities regulation is outlined at infra pp. II-
21 and accompanying notes.
63. The MSRB is a "self-regulatory organization" that helps develop regulations and set standards for
securities firms and banks involved in underwriting, trading, and selling municipal securities. TEMEL, supra
note 7, at 18. The MSRB's history and its role in municipal securities regulation is detailed at infra pp. 12-21
and accompanying notes.
64. FINRA is an independent "self-regulatory organization" authorized to oversee brokers, dealers, and
broker-dealers. E.g., COFFEE, JR. & SALE, supra note 7, at 63-64. FINRA was formed in 2007 when the
National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") merged with the New York Stock Exchange's
regulatory subsidiary. E.g., Order Approving Proposed Rule Change to Accommodate the Consolidation of
NASD and NYSE Regulation, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 56,145, 91 SEC Docket 404 (July 26, 2007).
Originally, the NASD was established as a result of the "Maloney Act" of 1938, which added section 15A to
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 thereby authorizing an association of brokers and dealers as a "national
securities association." Securities Exchange Act Amendments of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-719, §15A, 52 Stat.
1070, 1070-76 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (2006)). In effect, every broker and dealer must
become registered with FINRA and comply with its rules aimed at protecting investors. COFFEE, JR. & SALE,
supra note 7, at 64; see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(b)(8), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8) (2006) ("It
shall be unlawful for any registered broker or dealer to effect any transaction . .. unless such broker or dealer
is a member of a securities association registered pursuant to [section 15A] . . , ."). FINRA has authority to
enforce its own rules, as well as authority to enforce SEC rules and statutes that relate to brokers and dealers.
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15A(b)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(7) (2006). For an overview of
FINRA, see About the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth.,
http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA (last visited July 27, 2011).
65. The bank regulating agencies involved in enforcing municipal securities regulation include the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Reserve Board, the Comptroller of Currency, and the
Office of Thrift Supervision. E.g., Tesia Nicole Stanley, Narrowing the Disclosure Gap: Is EMMA EDGAR
for the Municipal Securities Market?, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 91, 101 (2010). Generally, banks are not subject
to securities regulation because the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 exempts "certain banking activities"
from the term "dealer." Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(5)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5)(C) (2006).
However, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 defines "municipal securities dealer" and that term does not
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Originally, the Securities Act of 1933 ("1933 Act") and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 ("1934 Act") limited municipal securities regulation to the
SEC's enforcement of a few antifraud statutes.66 Since the enactment of the 1933
Act and 1934 Act, municipal securities issuers have been exempted from the issuer
registration requirements placed upon most other securities.67 However, municipal
securities issuers have always been subject to the antifraud provisions outlined at
section 17 of the 1933 Act.68 Interestingly, many courts and commentators
conclude municipal securities issuers were not subject to the antifraud provisions
outlined at section 10 of the 1934 Act prior to 1975.69
The regulatory regime was comprised entirely of antifraud provisions until the
include the same general exemption for banking activities. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(30) ("The term 'municipal
securities dealer' means any person ... engaged in the business of buying and selling municipal securities for
his own account . . . ."). A "municipal securities dealer" must be registered with the SEC. Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 15B(a)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(a)(1)(A) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). The industry
refers to these banks that must be registered as "dealer banks." E.g., MSRB GLOSSARY, supra note 7, Dealer
Bank. As a result of this distinction, the bank regulating agencies are authorized to bring enforcement actions
against the "municipal securities dealers" that operate as "dealer banks"; whereas, FINRA is authorized to
bring enforcement actions against the "municipal securities dealers" that operate as general securities
"dealers." Div. OF MKT. REGULATION, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, STAFF REPORT ON THE MUNICIPAL
SECURITIES MARKET 7 (1993) [hereinafter SEC 1993 MUNICIPAL SECURITIES REPORT], available at
http://www.sec.gov/info/municipal/mr-munimarketreportl993.pdf.
66. Section 17 of the 1933 Act and section 10 of the 1934 Act are the antifraud statutes that pertain to
municipal securities issuers. Although sections 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act are also antifraud statutes, these
sections are not applicable in the municipal securities market because these sections apply only to registered
securities that trade on national securities exchanges. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k-771 (2006).
67. Section 2(a)(1) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2006), provides that bonds and notes are
securities. However, section 3(a)(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (2006), then exempts municipal
securities from the initial securities registration provisions outlined in section 5 of the 1933 Act unless
"expressly provided." Section 3(a)(12)(A) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(12)(A), and section 3(a)(29)
of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(29), operate to classify municipal securities as "exempted securities;"
thus, municipal securities are also exempted from the continuing registration provisions in the 1934 Act, see
generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78pp (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). These exemptions reflected a congressional belief
that constitutional dual-sovereignty issues would arise if municipal securities issuers were subjected to federal
regulation. William J. Kiernan, Jr., Disclosure Responsibilities in Municipal Securities Offerings - Some
Problems Under SEC Rule 15c2-12, 20 STETSON L. REV. 701, 701 (1991); see also H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at
30(1933).
68. Section 17 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (2006), relates to fraud in the "offer or sale of any
securities." The SEC often uses sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) when it brings an enforcement action against a
municipal securities issuer. See, e.g., New Jersey, Securities Act Release No. 9135, 2010 WL 3260860 (Aug.
18, 2010). Interestingly, sections 17(a)(2) and (a)(3) require mental culpability akin to negligent fraud, while
section 17(a)(1) requires mental culpability akin to intentional fraud. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695-
97, 701-02 (1980). Municipal securities issuers are subject to the antifraud provisions at section 17 because
section 17 applies to "persons" and section 2(a)(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(2) (2006), includes
"government or political subdivisions thereof' in the definition of "persons."
69. Section 10 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006), broadly restricts manipulative and deceptive
tactics in the securities markets. Section 10 is applicable to "persons" and section 3(a)(9) of the 1934 Act did
not include "government" in the definition of "person" until the enactment of the Securities Acts Amendments
of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 3(a)(9), 89 Stat. 97, 97 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(9) (2006)); see also
Mark Edward Laughman, Note, The Leaning Tower: Do the Proposed Amendments to SEC Rule 15c2-12
Violate the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975?, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1167, 1171 (1994). For a
discussion of the courts and commentators that concluded municipal securities were not subject to section 10
prior to 1975, see In re N. YC. Mun. Sec. Litig., 507 F. Supp. 169, 183-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). But see Adoption
of Temporary Rule 23a-l(T), Exchange Act Release No. 11,876, 8 SEC Docket 541 (Nov. 26, 1975) ("Rule
I Ob-5, which has always applied to all transactions in municipal securities . . . will continue to do so.").
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Securities Acts Amendments of 197570 was enacted in response to New York City's
near municipal bond default.7 1  This legislation enacted several significant
municipal securities related amendments to the 1934 Act. First, municipal
securities issuers were clearly made subject to the antifraud provisions codified at
section 10 of the 1934 Act.72 This was important because it also made municipal
securities issuers subject to the SEC's most extensive antifraud regulation, Rule
1Ob-5. 73 Second, the MSRB was established as a "self-regulatory organization." 74
The MSRB's mission is "to protect investors, issuers of municipal securities and
entities whose credit stands behind municipal securities, and public pension
plans." 75  However, the MSRB is disadvantaged in serving its mission for three
primary reasons. First, the MSRB was originally authorized to adopt regulations
only applicable to brokers, dealers, and underwriters.76 Second, the SEC must
approve any regulations proposed by the MSRB.77  Third, the MSRB has no
enforcement authority and must rely on the SEC, FINRA, and the various bank
regulating agencies to enforce its regulations.
70. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
71. Lisa A. Hamilton, Canary in the Coal Mine: Can the Campaign for Mandatory Climate Risk
Disclosure Withstand the Municipal Bond Market's Resistance to Regulatory Reform?, 36 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1014, 1021 (2010). For a brief overview of New York City's near default, see THAU, supra note 24, at
162-63. For an in-depth government report on New York City's near default, see U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM'N, STAFF REPORT ON TRANSACTIONS IN SECURITIES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK (1977), available at
http://www.sec.gov/info/municipal/staffreport0877.pdf.
72. The Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 3(a)(9), 89 Stat. 97, 97 (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(9) (2006)), amended section 3(a)(9) of the 1934 Act to include "government, or political
subdivision, agency or instrumentality of a government" in the definition of "person" thereby clearly making
municipal securities issuers subject to section 10 of the 1934 Act. See supra note 69.
73. In 1942, the SEC promulgated Rule 1Ob-5 pursuant to authority in section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.
Prohibition of Fraud by Any Person in Connection with the Purchase or Sale of Securities, 7 Fed. Reg. 3804
(May 22, 1942) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2011)).
74. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 15B, 89 Stat. 97, 131 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4 (2006)). A "self-regulatory organization" is a regulatory entity that specializes
in overseeing a particular market. COFFEE, JR. & SALE, supra note 7, at 63. These entities are funded by fees
assessed on that industry. Id. They are also generally controlled by industry personal although the SEC
retains ultimate authority. Id. The MSRB and FINRA are examples of self-regulatory organizations. For
further discussion of self-regulatory organizations, see id. at 63-66.
75. About the MSRB, MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD., http://www.msrb.org/About-MSRB.aspx (last
visited July 27, 2011).
76. Originally, the MSRB was only authorized to propose regulations applicable to "transactions in
municipal securities effected by brokers, dealers, and municipal securities dealers." Securities Acts
Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 15B(b)(2), 89 Stat. 97, 132 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-
4(b)(2) (Supp. IV 2010)). However, the Dodd-Frank Act expanded the MSRB's authority by permitting the
MSRB to propose regulations that are applicable to financial advisors. See infra p. 20 and accompanying
notes.
77. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 19(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(1) (2006) ("Each self-regulatory
organization shall file with the [SEC] . . . copies of any proposed rule or any proposed change in, addition to,
or deletion from the rules of such self-regulatory organization . . . No proposed rule change shall take effect
unless approved by the [SEC] . . . .").
78. Section 15B(c) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 780-4(c) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010), provides no
authority to the MSRB to enforce the regulations that it proposes. The SEC and MSRB are each adamant that
the MSRB has no enforcement authority and must rely on the SEC, FINRA, and the various bank regulating
agencies to enforce its rules. See SEC 1993 MUNICIPAL SECURITIES REPORT, supra note 65, at 7;
Enforcement of MSRB Rules, Mun. Sec. Rulemaking Bd., http://www.msrb.org/Municipal-Bond-
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The Securities Acts Amendments of 1975 also placed an additional statutory
restriction on municipal securities regulators through the enactment of the Tower
Amendment. 79  To fully understand the effect of the Tower Amendment, it is
important to first understand what regulatory regime could be possible without it.
Even though municipal securities have been exempted from the issuer registration
requirements outlined in the 1933 Act and 1934 Act, in theory a similar issuer-
based regulatory regime could be enacted in the municipal securities market
pursuant to the SEC's broad antifraud authority. But, the Tower Amendment
curtails this possibility by imposing additional regulatory restrictions on the SEC
and MSRB. Commentary from the SEC indicates that the Tower Amendment was
enacted to address "intergovernmental comity," which concerns the constitutional
dual-sovereignty issues associated with federal interference into state and local
governments.8 1
The Tower Amendment contains two provisions that expressly restrict federal
regulation in the municipal securities market.82 This Article relies on two important
distinctions between these two provisions. The first provision, codified at section
15B(d)(1) of the 1934 Act, places limitations on both the SEC and MSRB, and
Market/How-the-Market-is-Regulated/Enforcement-of-MSRB-Rules.aspx (last visited Oct. 3, 2011). This
view is widely-accepted in the industry. See, e.g., TEMEL, supra note 7, at 220. Nonetheless, the Dodd-Frank
Act expanded the MSRB's authority by permitting it to "provide guidance and assistance" in enforcing
compliance with regulations proposed by the MSRB. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
79. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 15B(d), 89 Stat. 97, 137 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 780-4(d) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)).
80. For a more detailed analysis of whether without the Tower Amendment an issuer-based regulatory
regime could be enacted pursuant to the SEC's antifraud authority, see Robert W. Doty & John E. Petersen,
The Federal Securities Laws and Transactions in Municipal Securities, 71 Nw. U. L. REV. 283, 301-02 (1976)
(emphasizing that the antifraud provisions are "vague and their boundaries are uncertain"). Although this
analysis concludes that the SEC would likely lack the authority "to promulgate municipal securities disclosure
forms or filing requirements," id. at 301, this analysis precedes Supreme Court jurisprudence favoring judicial
deference to administrative agencies, see, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837 (1984). The SEC has recently suggested that the municipal securities exemptions from the issuer
registration requirements in the 1933 Act and 1934 Act would prevent it from enacting an issuer-based
regulatory regime even if the Tower Amendment was repealed. See GAO MUNICIPAL SECURITIES REPORT,
supra note 21, at 23-24. However, this recent suggestion is a shift from previous SEC commentary regarding
whether repealing the Tower Amendment could lead to issuer-based regulation. See supra note 20.
81. Municipal Securities Disclosure, 53 Fed. Reg. 37,778, 37,786 (Sept. 28, 1988) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
pt. 240).
82. Modem commentators use the term "Tower Amendment" to refer to sections 15B(d)(1) and
15B(d)(2) of the 1934 Act. See, e.g., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, DISCLOSURE AND ACCOUNTING
PRACTICES IN THE MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKET 3 (2007) [hereinafter SEC 2007 MUNICIPAL SECURITIES
WHITE PAPER], available at http://sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-148wp.pdf; Laughman, supra note 69, at
1172. However, it might be more historically accurate if "Tower Amendment" referred only to section
15B(d)(2). See Municipal Securities Disclosure, 53 Fed. Reg. at 37,787; SEC 1993 MUNICIPAL SECURITIES
REPORT, supra note 65, at app. A at 11 n.33. Section 15B(d)(2) was added to the Securities Acts
Amendments of 1975 because of an amendment cosponsored by Senator John Tower. 121 CONG. REC.
10735-36 (1975); Doty & Petersen, supra note 80, at 346. This provision was the result of a contentious
legislative compromise orchestrated to limit the newly created MSRB from promulgating stringent continuing
"backdoor" regulation on issuers. See 121 CONG. REC. 10735-37 (1975); Doty & Petersen, supra note 80, at
345-47. On the other hand, section 15B(d)(1) was the result of a "rapidly secured agreement." 121 CONG.
REC. 10722 (1975) (showing that section 15B(d)(1) was included in the initial proposal that would later be
enacted as the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975); Doty & Petersen, supra note 80, at 345 (explaining that
rapidly secured agreements led to the prohibition on filing requirements prior to the issuance of municipal
securities).
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restricts municipal securities regulation in primary market issuances. It states:
Neither the Commission nor the Board is authorized under this
chapter, by rule or regulation, to require any issuer of municipal
securities, directly or indirectly through a purchaser or prospective
purchaser of securities from the issuer, to file with the Commission
or the Board prior to the sale of such securities by the issuer any
application, report, or document in connection with the issuance,
sale, or distribution of such securities.83
The second provision, codified at section 15B(d)(2) of the 1934 Act, places
limitations on only the MSRB and restricts municipal securities regulation in
secondary market transactions. It states:
The Board is not authorized under this chapter to require any issuer
of municipal securities, directly or indirectly through a municipal
securities broker, municipal securities dealer, municipal advisor, or
otherwise, to furnish to the Board or to a purchaser or a prospective
purchaser of such securities any application, report, documents, or
information with respect to such issuer: Provided, however, that the
Board may require municipal securities brokers and municipal
securities dealers or municipal advisors to furnish to the Board or
purchasers or prospective purchasers of municipal securities
applications, reports, documents, and information with respect to the
issuer thereof which is generally available from a source other than
such issuer. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to impair or
limit the power of the Commission under any provision of this
chapter. 84
Interestingly, there is no legislative history that specifically addresses the
SEC's exclusion from the second provision.85
The two distinctions between the Tower Amendment's two provisions have led
to a "backdoor" regulation of municipal securities that operates differently in the
primary market compared to the secondary market.86 This Part chronologically
discusses the development of this "backdoor" regulation. The SEC justifies this
compromised style of regulation by relying on antifraud provisions in the 1934 Act,
including section 15(c)(2) which forbids brokers and dealers from engaging in
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative practices.
83. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(d)(1) (2006).
84. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(d)(2)(Supp. IV 2010).
85. Laughman, supra note 69, at 1196. However, for some detailed insight into the legislative history of
the Securities Acts Amendment of 1975, see Doty & Petersen, supra note 80, at 343-48.
86. The primary market is the market where new issues of municipal securities are initially sold by
issuers to investors typically with an underwriter acting as an intermediary. MSRB GLOSSARY, supra note 7,
Primary Market, New Issue Municipal Securities; see also supra p. 8. The secondary market is the continuing
market for securities that have already been issued in the primary market. TEMEL, supra note 7, at 254;
MSRB GLOSSARY, supra note 7, Secondary Market. For additional discussion of how the Tower
Amendment's first provision pertains to primary market issuances, see infra pp. 30-31 and accompanying
notes.
87. Municipal securities "backdoor" regulation is currently applied through Rules 15c2-12 and G-32.
See infra pp. 15-18 and accompanying notes. The SEC justifies Rule 15c2-12 by relying on section 15(c)(2)
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In 1989, the SEC adopted "backdoor" regulation in the primary market by
promulgating Rule 15c2-12. This enactment was in response to Washington
Public Power Supply System's default on $2.25 billion of municipal bonds. 89
Essentially, the original rule simply required that underwriters in most municipal
securities issuances "obtain and review" the issuer's "official statement" and
distribute that official statement to any potential customer upon request. 90  The
official statement is intended to replicate the prospectus that is used in most
corporate issuances,91 but Rule 15c2-12 grants the underwriter and issuer
significant discretion to decide the official statement's contents and disclosures.9 2
Thus, many commentators argue Rule 15c2-12 requires only "voluntary
disclosure." 93  Nonetheless, the SEC interpretive release that accompanied the
adoption of the rule emphasized that the underwriter must have a "reasonable basis"
to believe the truthfulness, completeness, and accuracy of the key representations
contained in the official statement.94
In 1990, the SEC increased primary market regulation by approving MSRB
Rule G-36, which originally required underwriters to submit "copies" of the official
statements they obtained through Rule 15c2-12 to either the MSRB or its
designee. 95  The MSRB proposed this rule because it was concerned that Rule
15c2-12 disclosure was not widely disseminated since it was available only upon
of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(2) (Supp. IV 2010) (forbidding brokers, dealers, and municipal securities
dealers from engaging in fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative practices). See Municipal Securities
Disclosure, 54 Fed. Reg. 28,799, 28,800 (July 10, 1989) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12 (2011)). The
SEC justifies Rule G-32 by relying on section 15B(b)(2)(C) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(b)(2)(C)
(Supp. IV 2010) (permitting the MSRB to propose regulations that are designed to prevent fraudulent and
manipulative acts). See Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Delivery of Official
Statements and Recordkeeping, 55 Fed. Reg. 23,333, 23,336 (June 7, 1990). Rule G-32 was first adopted as
Rule G-36. See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
88. Municipal Securities Disclosure, 54 Fed. Reg. 28,799.
89. Hamilton, supra note 71, at 1022. For a brief history of this default, see MOODY'S DEFAULT
REPORT, supra note 30, at 17-18.
90. Municipal Securities Disclosure, 54 Fed. Reg. at 28,799. The original rule and the existing rule only
apply this requirement to issuances with an aggregate principal amount of $1 million or more. SEC
Municipal Securities Disclosure Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12 (2011); Municipal Securities Disclosure, 54
Fed. Reg. at 28,799.
91. MSRB GLOSSARY, supra note 7, Official Statement (defining the official statement as "functionally
equivalent" to the prospectus that is used in most corporate securities issuances).
92. E.g., TEMEL, supra note 7, at 66 ("There is no list of mandatory information that must be included in
the official statement.").
93. See, e.g., Lisa M. Fairchild & Nan S. Ellis, Municipal Bond Disclosure: Remaining Inadequacies of
Mandatory Disclosure Under Rule 15c2-12, 23 J. CORP. L. 439, 461 (1998) ("Because the parties control the
content of the official statement and secondary disclosures, any disclosures are, in effect, voluntary."). For an
analysis of the different accounting standards used in municipal securities disclosure, see infra p. 18 and
accompanying notes.
94. Municipal Securities Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 26,985, 43 SEC Docket 1880, 1887,
1899 (June 28, 1989). In one of the few municipal securities cases to be litigated in court, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the industry standard of care is one factor to consider in
determining whether the underwriter satisfied the "reasonable prudence" standard. SEC v. Dain Rauscher,
Inc., 254 F.3d 852, 854 (9th Cir. 2001). However, the court stressed that the industry standard of care is not
the "determinative factor." Id.
95. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Delivery of Official Statements and
Recordkeeping, 55 Fed. Reg. 23,333, 23,333 (June 7, 1990).
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request.96 In addition, the MSRB was concerned that Rule 15c2-12 did not allow
investors in the secondary market the ability to reliably and regularly obtain official
statements. 97  In 1991, the MSRB was permitted to establish the Municipal
Securities Information Library as a central electronic repository for the official
statements it collected pursuant to Rule G-36.98 In May 2009, the SEC approved
the MSRB's consolidation of Rule G-36 into Rule G-32,99 and approved the
MSRB's official replacement of the Municipal Securities Information Library with
the Electronic Municipal Market Access system ("EMMA"). 00
In 1994, the SEC extended Rule 15c2-12 "backdoor" regulation into the
secondary market.' 0 ' Again, this expansion was enacted in response to market
events. This time, the bankruptcy and default of Orange County, California
precipitated the changes.102 As a result, Rule 15c2-12 now also generally prohibits
an underwriter from participating in an issuance unless the underwriter initially
obtains a written agreement or contract requiring the issuer or "obligated person" 0 3
to disclose continuing financial information.104 These continuing disclosure
requirements include what amounts to an annual official statement and notice of
specified financial events. os The SEC has recently amended and clarified the
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change of Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board Relating to the
Proposed Operation of the Municipal Securities Information Library System, 56 Fed. Reg. 28,194 (June 19,
1991).
99. MSRB Disclosures in Connection with Primary Offerings, Mun. Sec. Rulemaking Bd. Rule G-32
(2011). The former Rule G-32 generally required brokers and dealers selling a recently issued municipal
security to deliver to the customer the official statement. Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating
to the Establishment of a Primary Market Disclosure Service and Trade Price Transparency Service of the
Electronic Municipal Market Access System and Amendments to MSRB Rules G-32 and G-36, 74 Fed. Reg.
15,190, 15,190 (Apr. 2, 2009). Similarly, the former MSRB Rule G-36 required dealers acting as an
underwriter in a municipal securities issuance to submit the official statement to the MSRB or its designee.
Id. at 15,191. This Article analyzes the legal validity of Rules 15c2-12 and G-32 by determining whether
these regulations could be enforced in court considering the first provision of the Tower Amendment. See
infra Part IV.
100. Order Granting Approval of Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Establishment of a Primary
Market Disclosure Service and Trade Price Transparency Service of the Electronic Municipal Market Access
System and Amendments to MSRB Rules G-32 and 6-36, 74 Fed. Reg. 25,790 (May 29, 2009).
101. Municipal Securities Disclosure, 59 Fed. Reg. 59,590 (Nov. 17, 1994) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt.
240).
102. See Hamilton, supra note 71, at 1022-23. For an overview of Orange County's bankruptcy and
default, see PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL., WHEN GOVERNMENT FAILS: THE ORANGE COUNTY BANKRUPTCY
(1998), available at http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/op/OP_3980P.pdf
103. SEC Municipal Securities Disclosure Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(f)(10) (2011) ("[O]bligated
person means any person, including an issuer of municipal securities, who is . . . generally . . . committed by
contract or other arrangement to support payment . . . on the municipal securities to be sold in the Offering
(other than providers of municipal bond insurance, letters of credit, or other liquidity facilities).") (emphasis
omitted); see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §15B(e)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(e)(10) (Supp. IV 2010)
(providing a similar definition of "obligated person").
104. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(b)(5)(i).
105. Id. Notice of a specified financial event must be filed "in a timely manner not in excess of ten
business days after the occurrence of the event." Id. § 240.15c2-12(b)(5)(i)(C). Examples of financial events
include principal and interest payment delinquencies, non-payment related defaults, adverse opinions on the
tax status of the security, bond calls, and rating changes. Id.
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specified financial events that must be disclosed. 106 Originally, the SEC designated
entities called nationally recognized municipal securities information repositories
("NRMSIRs")'o7 and state information depositories ("SIDs") os as the filing
recipients of continuing disclosure. 109  In December 2008, however, the SEC
adopted amendments to Rule 15c2-12 officially designating EMMA as the central
repository for continuing disclosure.110
The existing municipal securities "backdoor" regulatory regime includes two
peculiarities of particular importance. First, the issuer's initial and continuing
financial disclosure is not required to be provided according to a uniform
accounting standard because the SEC remains adamant that it lacks the authority to
mandate standardized disclosure practices in the municipal securities market."'
Thus, most municipal securities issuers provide financial disclosure according to
voluntary industry standards or according to their mandated state or local
standard.l12 This current practice is problematic, of course, because some standards
106. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Continuing Disclosure Service of the
MSRB Electronic Municipal Market Access (EMMA) System, 75 Fed. Reg. 52,383, 52,383-84 (Aug. 25,
2010); Amendment to Municipal Securities Disclosure, 75 Fed. Reg. 33,100 (June 10, 2010) (codified at 17
C.F.R. pt. 240 and 241).
107. In 2008, the four remaining NRMSIRs included DPC DATA Inc., Standard & Poor's Securities
Evaluation Inc., Interactive Data Pricing and Reference Data Inc., and Bloomberg Municipal Repository.
Andrew Ackerman, SEC OKs EMMA as NRMSIR, BOND BUYER, Dec. 5, 2008, http://www.bondbuyer.
com/issues/117_232/-297217-I.html. For some background on NRMSIRs, see id.
108. The SEC indicates that the only states operating SIDs are Texas, Michigan and Ohio. Sources of
Amicipal Securities Information, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, http://www.sec.gov/answers/nrmsir.htm (last
modified Jan, 26 2011). For an overview of state municipal securities disclosure laws, see Fairchild & Ellis,
supra note 93, at 454-56.
109. Municipal Securities Disclosure, 59 Fed. Reg. 59,590, 59,594 (Nov. 17, 1994) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
pt. 240) ("For purposes of the amendments, documents will be considered to be publicly available if they have
been submitted to each NRMSIR and to the appropriate state information depository . . .. ").
110. Amendment to Municipal Securities Disclosure, 73 Fed. Reg. 76,104 (Dec. 15, 2008) (codified at 17
C.F.R. pt. 240). For additional discussion of the SEC's reasoning in switching to EMMA, see Ackerman,
supra note 107.
111. SEC 2012 MUNICIPAL SECURITIES REPORT, supra note 20, at 71 ("There are no uniformly applied
accounting standards in the municipal securities market, and the [SEC] generally lacks authority to prescribe
the accounting standards that municipal issuers must use."); SEC 2007 MUNICIPAL SECURITIES WHITE PAPER,
supra note 82, at 6-9 ("The [SEC] has not been explicitly authorized to regulate accounting and financial
reporting standards for municipal issuers."); Elisse B. Walter, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Speech
by SEC Commissioner: Regulation of the Municipal Securities Market: Investors Are Not Second-Class
Citizens (Oct. 28, 2009), available at http://www.scc.gov/news/speech/2009/spchl02809ebw.htm ("The
Commission is thus prohibited from . . . mandating that municipal issuers use 'generally accepted'
governmental accounting standards."). Surprisingly, the SEC has not tried to argue that its broad antifraud
authority justifies implementing uniform accounting standards. See supra pp. 11-12 and accompanying notes.
Instead, the SEC recently recommended that Congress grant it explicit authority to establish uniform
accounting standards. SEC 2012 MUNICIPAL SECURITIES REPORT, supra note 20, at 136.
112. The Government Finance Officers Association ("GFOA") and the Governmental Accounting
Standards Board ("GASB") have each put forward industry standards for municipal securities disclosure. See,
e.g., TEMEL, supra note 7, at 216. GASB has established "generally accepted accounting principles" that are
used by many municipal securities issuers. SEC 2007 MUNICIPAL SECURITIES WHITE PAPER, supra note 82,
at 7. However, some states require accounting standards that differ significantly from GASB. Id. at 8. It is
estimated that about 20,000 of the more than 50,000 total municipal securities issuers use an accounting
standard that does not conform to GASB's generally accepted accounting standards. Id. at 7-8. For an
overview of how GFOA disclosure standards differ with corporate disclosure requirements, see SEC 1993
MUNICIPAL SECURITIES REPORT, supra note 65, at app. C.
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are more transparent.l13 As a result, it can be difficult for an investor or analyst to
conduct an accurate and efficient comparison between municipal securities of
different issuers.l14
Second, Rules 15c2-12 and G-32 do not expressly provide a noncompliance
remedy. As a result, it is uncertain whether a private cause of action exists for the
failure to comply with Rules 15c2-12 and G-32." 5  The SEC, FINRA, and the
various bank regulating agencies have several available remedies for enforcing
noncompliance even though Rules 15c2-12 and G-32 do not expressly provide a
noncompliance remedy. Collectively, this means that municipal securities
investors are largely reliant on the regulators to compel disclosure.
Finally, two recent developments in the municipal securities market deserve
additional attention. First, the MSRB's recent creation of EMMA is significant
because it provides a free, online, centralized repository for both initial and
113. For example, Texas recently enacted a law requiring that the state not use a GASB accounting
standard that requires governments to report the accrued costs of health care and employment benefits. SEC
2007 MUNICIPAL SECURITIES WHITE PAPER, supra note 82, at 8 n.33. Thus, pursuant to state law, this
questionable accounting practice will likely be incorporated into the financial statements that Texas discloses
when issuing municipal securities.
114. Seeid.at8.
115. Several federal district courts have held that there is no private cause of action to enforce the MSRB
rules. See Prager v. FMS Bonds, Inc., No. 09-80775-CIV, 2010 WL 2950065, at *7 (S.D. Fla. July 26, 2010)
(holding that there is no private cause of action to enforce MSRB rules); Charter House, Inc. v. First Tenn.
Bank, N.A., 693 F. Supp. 593, 597-98 (M.D. Tenn. 1988) (holding that there is no private cause of action to
enforce MSRB Rule G-19); Redstone v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 583 F. Supp. 74, 77 (D. Mass. 1984)
(holding that there is no private cause of action to enforce MSRB Rules G-17 and G-19). Nonetheless, a
litigant could rely on analogous Supreme Court jurisprudence to argue that an "implied" remedy exists
permitting private enforcement actions against brokers, dealers, and underwriters for noncompliance with
Rules 15c2-12 and G-32. For example, the Supreme Court has held that an implied private cause of action
exists to enforce compliance with section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule lOb-5. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners,
LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 164-66 (2008); Superintendent of Ins, of N.Y. v. Bankers Life
& Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971). However, after a few early decisions upheld an implied private cause
of action under section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, the more recent cases have generally rejected an implied private
cause of action under section 17(a). COFFEE , JR. & SALE, supra note 7, at 929. At least one commentator
argues that the judicial and legislative trend in federal securities law favors permitting fewer private causes of
action. Gabaldon, supra note 57, at 768.
116. Section 15(b)(4) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4) (2006), empowers the SEC to bring
enforcement actions against brokers, dealers, and underwriters for willful violations of the 1934 Act,
regulations promulgated pursuant to the 1934 Act, or any regulations proposed by the MSRB. The remedies
available to the SEC for such violations include censuring, suspending, or limiting the violator's activities. Id.
Also, Section 21B of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2 (2006), authorizes the SEC to demand monetary
penalties for such violations and section 21C of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3 (2006), provides the SEC
general authority to order that any securities violation "cease and desist." In addition, section 15A(b)(7) of
the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(7) (2006), empowers FINRA to bring enforcement actions against
brokers, dealers, and underwriters for violations of the 1934 Act, regulations promulgated pursuant to the
1934 Act, as well as any regulation proposed by the MSRB or FINRA. The remedies available to FINRA for
such violations by brokers, dealers, and underwriters include expulsion, suspension, censure, limiting the
violator's activities, or "any other fitting sanction." Id. Lastly, section 15B(c)(5) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §
78o-4(c)(5) (2006), empowers the various bank regulating agencies to bring enforcement actions against
"dealer banks" for violations of the municipal securities provisions in the 1934 Act, municipal securities
regulations promulgated pursuant to the 1934 Act, or any regulations proposed by the MSRB. The remedies
available to the various bank regulating agencies for such violations by "dealer banks" include censuring,
suspending, or limiting the violator's activities. See id.; Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15B(c)(2), 15
U.S.C. § 78o-4(c)(2) (2006).
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continuing municipal securities disclosure.17 EMMA has received praise because
municipal securities disclosure was previously difficult to obtain. 18 EMMA is
intended to replicate EDGAR, which is the SEC's successful online repository for
corporate securities disclosure.119
Second, the recent enactment of the Dodd-Frank Actl20 affects the municipal
securities regulatory regime in three important ways.121 First, the Dodd-Frank Act
expands the MSRB's authority by permitting it to "provide guidance and
assistance" in enforcing compliance with its proposed regulations.122 Second, the
Dodd-Frank Act imposes a fiduciary duty on "municipal advisors" 2 and
authorizes the MSRB to propose regulations that affect these advisors.124 This is a
significant development because municipal advisors include the financial advisors
in a municipal securities issuance.125 Finally, commentators argue that the Dodd-
Frank Act requires that municipal securities swaps be disclosed, but that municipal
securities are likely exempted from the swap registration requirements and other
117. See EMMA - Electronic Municipal Market Access, MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD.,
http://emma.msrb.org (last visited June 20, 2011).
118. See Andrew Ackerman, Changing of the Guard, BOND BUYER, Dec. 19, 2008, http://www.
bondbuyer.com/issues/1 17 242/-297645-I.htmi. Previously, free primary market disclosure was only
available to visitors to the MSRB's facility in Alexandria, Virginia. Stanley, supra note 65, at 105.
Alternatively, primary market and secondary market disclosure could be obtained through fee subscription
services from the MSIL and NRMSIRs. Id.; Ackerman, supra. Municipal securities market participants
criticized the NRMSIRs for the "inconsistent manner in which the repositories collected and displayed
disclosure documents." Stanley, supra note 65, at 107-08.
119. See generally id. For a brief overview of EDGAR, see Important Information About EDGAR, U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, http://www.sec.gov/edgar/aboutedgar.htm (last modified Feb. 16, 2010).
120. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). Enacted in July 2010, this legislation aimed to
combat the causes of the recent financial crisis, which stemmed largely from the mortgage-backed securities
and over-the-counter derivatives markets. See generally Macchiarola, supra note 6, at 269-73.
121. For a concise overview of how the Dodd-Frank Act affects the municipal securities market, see
NAT'L ASS'N OF BOND LAWYERS, DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
(PUB. L. No. 111-205): KEY PROVISIONS RELATED TO MUNICIPAL SECURITIES,
http://www.nabl.org/uploads/cms/documents/doddfrankshortsummary FINAL.pdf (last visited June 23,
2012).
122. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 § 975(b)(4), 124 Stat. at
1920 (codified at Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15B(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(b)(4) (Supp. IV 2010)).
123. Id. at § 975(c)(2), 124 Stat. at 1920 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(c)(1)). A fiduciary duty is a
common law duty to disclose material information to the client. See generally HAZEN, supra note 45, §
4.15, at 605-09; COFFEE, JR. & SALE, supra note 7, at 671-72. A proposed rule implementing the fiduciary
duty requirement for municipal advisors would have established a duty of loyalty and a duty of care. Notice
of Filing of Proposed Rule G-36 and a Proposed Interpretive Notice Concerning the Application of Proposed
Rule G-36, 76 Fed. Reg. 56,254, 56,254-55 (proposed Sept. 12, 2011). A rule implementing the fiduciary
duty requirement has not yet been adopted. Notice of Withdrawal of Proposed Rule G-36 and a Proposed
Interpretive Notice Concerning the Application of Proposed Rule G-36, 76 Fed. Reg. 60,955 (Sept. 30, 2011).
124. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 § 975(b)(2)(A)(i), 124 Stat.
at 1917 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(b)(2)). The SEC has struggled with implementing the regulations that
will affect municipal advisors. See Joan Quiqley, SEC May Not Finalize Muni Advisor Rule for Nine Months,
BOND BUYER, Dec. 21, 2011, http://www.bondbuyer.com/news/sec-muni-adviser-rule-10 34 4 93 -I.html; Joan
Quiqley, Dodd-Frank Sparks Anxiety Issues, BOND BUYER, July 13, 2011,
http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/1 20133/dodd-frank-one-year-later- 1028836-1.html.
125. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 § 975(e)(4), 124 Stat. at
1921-22 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(e)(4)).
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mandates on asset-backed securities.126 Surprisingly, the Dodd-Frank Act relies
heavily on rulemaking, which has largely not yet been promulgated, particularly
with respect to the municipal securities market.127 As a result, its affect on the
municipal securities market often lacks clarity.128 This is fitting because overall the
municipal securities regulatory regime is unique and contains many uncertainties.
III. REGULATORY INADEQUACIES
In theory, the municipal securities market is a regulated market. However, the
Tower Amendment acts to restrict much of the available oversight to the
"backdoor" regulation of brokers, dealers, and underwriters.1 29  This framework
begs the question of whether this regulatory regime is adequate. This Part outlines
the basic principles underpinning federal securities regulation and then applies these
principles to the municipal securities market to determine if the "backdoor"
regulatory regime is adequate. This Part concludes that regulatory inadequacies
exist in the municipal securities market largely as a result of sparse regulatory
enforcement.
Federal securities regulation is grounded in the related principles of investor
protection and disclosure.130  These principles relate to the unique nature of a
"security."l31 The theory is that investors deserve increased protection in the
securities markets because the investment they are purchasing often cannot be
physically inspected.132 Therefore, to help protect investors, the existing securities
regulation framework often mandates the disclosure of important information
because this should permit investors to make more informed investment
decisions.133  In addition, some argue the disclosure must be required because
126. NAT'L ASS'N OF BOND LAWYERS, supra note 121, at 4-5. A swap is a speculative contractual
arrangement where the issuer and a counterparty simultaneously sell each other counteracting securities for
the purpose of altering the issuer's cash flows. Hildreth & Zom, supra note 6, at 135; MSRB GLOSSARY,
supra note 7, Swap. In the municipal securities market, the counterparty is often the underwriter and the swap
is typically offered to the issuer to help hedge against interest rate risk. MSRB GLOSSARY, supra note 7,
Interest Rate Swap Contract. For a practical explanation of how swaps generally operate, see COFFEE, JR. &
SALE, supra note 7, at 24.
127. The delay in promulgating regulations pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act has created significant
uncertainty in the municipal securities market. Joan Quiqley, Dodd-Frank Sparks Anxiety Issues, BOND
BUYER, July 13, 2011, http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/120 133/dodd-frank-one-year-later-1028836-
I.html.
128. Id.
129. See supra Part II.
130. See COFFEE, JR. & SALE, supra note 7, at 2-5; Macchiarola, supra note 22, at 44 ("[Federal securities
legislation] embraced a disclosure-based system of regulation and represented an attempt to minimize the
financial risks that an investor faces when investing on the basis of imperfect or insufficient information.").
131. See supra note 22.
132. COFFEE, JR. & SALE, supra note 7, at 4-5.
133. Id. at 5. Disclosure in the securities markets relates to the principle that securities regulation not be
overly paternalistic. See id. at 4. Thus, this principle permits an investor to purchase high-risk securities so
long as that investor is provided the appropriate disclosure to make an informed investment decision. Id.
This principle is critical because the securities markets rely on investors having divergent views, whereby
investors receive financial reward for efficiently investing their capital.
256 [Vol. 38:2
A Callfor Action
otherwise negative information would not be routinely disclosed.134 Frequently, the
disclosure is required in a standardized format because the value of securities can
only be derived through comparison to similar securities.135 Finally, history shows
that there is a close relationship between the securities markets and the health of the
national economy.136 Thus, the principles of investor protection and disclosure also
serve a general public policy purpose by helping instill integrity in the securities
markets. 137
The regulatory environment in the municipal securities market provides
inadequate investor protection and disclosure. This Part discusses the related
inadequacies in investor protection and disclosure, and then makes the case that
these inadequacies largely exist because there has been sparse regulatory
enforcement.
Current data suggest increased default riskl38 is a reasonable investor
protection concern in the municipal securities market. Admittedly though,
municipal securities have a stellar credit history, which would otherwise suggest
adequate investor protection exists. 139 For example, only fifty-four Moody's-rated
municipal bonds have defaulted since 1970140 and no state has defaulted on a
municipal securities obligation since Arkansas during the Great Depression.141
However, these are not typical economic times and the recent United States credit
downgrade indicates that even the unthinkable is now possible.142  Current data
overwhelmingly suggest that state and local issuers face unprecedented levels of
short-term and long-term fiscal stress. This implies increased investor protection
concerns exist in the municipal securities market because investors are increasingly
134. Id. at 5.
135. Id. at 4-5.
136. Id. at 3 ("When Wall Street sneezed (as it did massively in October, 1929), the rest of America could
become seriously ill."). When the integrity of the securities markets is compromised it can lead to rampant
disinvestment, which in tum negatively affects the national economy. See id. at 2-3.
137. Id., at 2-4; see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2006) ("[Tiransactions in
securities as commonly conducted upon securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets are affected with a
national public interest which makes it necessary to provide for regulation and control of such transactions
and of practices and matters related thereto . . . .").
138. The term default can refer to different types of investor risks. Dave Kansas, Why Muni Bond Fears
Are Overblown, SMARTMONEY.COM (Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.smartmoney.com/invest/bonds/why-muni-
bond-fears-are-overblown-I 296505922037/. Generally, there are two types of defaults. MSRB Glossary,
supra note 7, Default. A "monetary default" occurs when the issuer fails to pay principal or interest when
due. Id. Thus, a default still occurs even if the investors are paid partially or in full at a later date. See
Kansas, supra. Conversely, a "technical default" occurs when a contractually defined event of default occurs.
MSRB Glossary, supra note 7, Default. This could include failing to maintain insurance or failing to fund
financial reserves. Id. This Article is referring to "monetary defaults" when using the term "default" because
this type of default is the more serious investor protection concern since it results in non-payment.
139. See generally MOODY's DEFAULT REPORT, supra note 30. Moody's recently released report found
"the average 5-year historical cumulative default rate for investment-grade municipal debt is 0.03%,
compared to 0.97% for corporate issuers, while for speculative-grade debt the rates are 3.4% and 21.4% for
municipals and corporate issuers respectively." Id. at 2.
140. Id.
141. For an overview of Arkansas' default, see Monica Davey, The State That Went Bust, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 22, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/23/weekinreview/23davey.html.
142. Damian Paletta & Matt Phillips, S&P Strips U.S. of Top Credit Rating, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903366504576490841235575386.html.
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subject to default risk. Overall, state issuers are currently facing short-term annual
expenditures that are outpacing annual revenues. 143 Moreover, the states have long-
term fiscal stress from sizable yet growing public pension and healthcare
obligations.144 It is conceivable that the states could quickly correct their short-
term fiscal imbalances, but the states would likely have to reduce revenue transfers
to local governments to do so.145 The budgetary impact on local governments from
declining state transfers will be magnified because local governments are only now
starting to experience the decline in property tax revenue.146 In addition, many
local governments are exposed to the same long-term public pension and healthcare
obligations as state governments.147  Some commentators respond that the
143. See LUCY DADAYAN & DONALD J. BOYD, NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER INST. OF Gov'T, STATE
REVENUE REPORT: STATE TAX REVENUES GAINED NEW STRENGTH IN FOURTH QUARTER 20 (2011),
available at http://www.rockinst.org/pdf/govemmentfinance/state revenue report/2011-02-01-SRR 82.pdf
("Elements driving this still cloudy outlook include expiration of federal stimulus money and expenditure
trendlines that would produce increases beyond the level of available revenues. States will continue to search
for ways to climb out of a very deep hole."); PHIL OLIFF, CHRIS MAI & VINCENT PALACIOS, CTR. ON BUDGET
& POLICY PRIORITIES, STATES CONTINUE TO FEEL RECESSION'S IMPACT (2012), available at
http://www.cbpp.org/files/2-8-08sfp.pdf(discussing state budget shortfalls).
144. The Pew Center on the States recently released an alarming report, which stated:
[T]he gap between the promises states made for employee's retirement benefits and the money they set
aside to pay for them grew to at least $1.26 trillion in fiscal year 2009, resulting in a 26% increase in one
year. State pension plans represented slightly more than half of this shortfall, with $2.28 trillion stowed
away to cover $2.94 trillion in long-term liabilities - leaving about a $660 billion gap . . . . Retiree health
care and other benefits accounted for the remaining $607 billion, with assets totaling $31 billion to pay for
$638 billion in liabilities.
PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, THE WIDENING GAP: THE GREAT RECESSION'S IMPACT ON STATE PENSION AND
RETIREE HEALTH CARE COSTS 1 (2011), available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.
org/uploadedFiles/Pewpensions retiree benefits.pdf; see also STATE BUDGET CRISIS TASK FORCE, REPORT
OF THE STATE BUDGET CRISIS TASK FORCE (2012), available at http://www.statebudgetcrisis.org/wpcms/wp-
content/images/Report-of-the-State-Budget-Crisis-Task-Force-Full.pdf; Joshua D. Rauh, Are State Public
Pensions Sustainable?: Why the Federal Government Should Worry About State Pension Liabilities (May 15,
2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id= 1596679.
145. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FISCAL STRESS FACED BY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 1 (2010), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/120xx/doc l2005/12-09-MunicipalitiesBrief.pdf ("Collectively, local
governments derive nearly one-third of their revenues from state aid, about one-quarter from property taxes,
one-tenth from sales and other taxes, and most of the remainder from fees and miscellaneous revenues; only 4
percent represents direct aid from the federal government.").
146. LUCY DADAYAN, NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER INST. OF Gov'T, THE IMPACT OF THE GREAT
RECESSION ON LOCAL PROPERTY TAXES (2012), available at
htp://www.rockinst.org/pdf/govemment-finance/2012-07-16-RecessionLocal %2OPropertyTax.pdf; LUCY
DADAYAN & ROBERT. B. WARD, NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER INST. OF GOv'T, STATE REVENUE REPORT: PIT,
OVERALL TAX REVENUES SHOW STRONG GROWTH IN SECOND QUARTER 2, 3 fig.3 (2011), available at
http://www.rockinst.org/pdf/govemment finance/staterevenue report/2011-10-26-SRR_85.pdf ("For most
of the period during and after the last recession, local tax collections remained relatively strong. However, the
trends are now shifting due in part to the lagged impact of falling housing prices on property tax
collections."); CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 145, at 2 ("On average, collections of property tax revenue
lag behind changes in house prices by three years.").
147. A report by the Congressional Budget Office stated: "The ability of some local governments to
decrease spending is sometimes limited by federal and state requirements, particularly laws that require local
governments to pay for a portion of the costs of certain services. For example, more than half of the states
require local governments to contribute a share of the costs of the state's Medicaid program. Many states also
restrict the way local governments deliver services - regardless of the local government's fiscal situation. For
example, many states cover local employees under their pension plans and restrict the extent to which local
governments can reduce their contributions to the plans when revenues fall." CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra
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repayment on municipal securities debt currently comprises only a small portion of
state and local budgets.148 Even if this is true, the fiscal pressures felt by state and
local governments is long-term stress in addition to short-term stress. Thus,
increased investor protection concerns will persist in the municipal securities
market because the default risk is not easily or quickly correctable.
Regardless, industry reports and commentary indicate that investor protection
and disclosure problems clearly exist in the municipal securities market as a result
of pervasive noncompliance with continuing disclosure requirements. Two recent
industry reports make three important findings.149  First, more than one-third of
recent municipal securities issuers failed to comply with the Rule 15c2-12
continuing disclosure requirements.150 Second, investors were more likely to pay
above the principal amount for a distressed municipal bond in the secondary market
if that bond was missing continuing disclosure.151 Finally, even if continuing
disclosure is provided, it is most often "stale" because on average the required
continuing disclosure is filed over 200 days after the issuer's fiscal year end.152
Surprisingly, the SEC has publicly acknowledged most of these findings.153  In
note 145, at 5.
For a discussion of local governments that face fiscal troubles because of growing public pension
obligations, see Michael Cooper & Mary Williams Walsh, Alabama Town's Failed Pension Is a Warning,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/23/business/23prichard.htmi and Mary
Williams Walsh & Michael Cooper, Faltering Rhode Island City Tests Vows to Pensioners, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
13, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/13/us/3bankruptcy.html.
148. E.g., THALIA MEEHAN, PUTNAM INVS., SEPARATING FACT FROM FICTION IN THE MUNICIPAL BOND
MARKET 4 (2011), available at https://content.putnam.comliterature/pdf/11901.pdf; Joe Mysak, Meredith
Whitney Overreaches with Muni Meltdown Call, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 21, 2010, 9:00 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-12-22/meredith-whitney-overreaches-in-muni-default-call-
commentary-by-joe-mysak.html.
149. PETER J. SCHMITT, DPC DATA INC., RECENT TRENDS IN MUNICIPAL CONTINUING DISCLOSURE
ACTIVITIES (2011) [hereinafter DPC DATA 2011 REPORT], available at http://www.dpcdata.com/htmlabout-
researchpapers.html; PETER J. SCHMITT, DPC DATA INC., THE CONSEQUENCES OF POOR DISCLOSURE
ENFORCEMENT IN THE MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKET (2009) [hereinafter DPC DATA 2009 REPORT],
available at http://www.dpcdata.com/htmVabout-researchpapers.html. DPC DATA Inc. is a former
NRMSIR. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. DPC DATA Inc. is believed to be the NRMSIR that
was most harmed by the switch to EMMA. Andrew Ackerman, Delinquent Disclosure, BOND BUYER, Sept.
3, 2008, http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/ 117 168/-294051-I.html.
150. DPC DATA 2011 REPORT, supra note 149, at 6-12.
151. DPC DATA 2009 REPORT, supra note 149, at 14-15.
152. DPC DATA 2011 REPORT, supra note 149, at 13-17.
153. SEC Commissioner Elisse B. Walter stated: "[R]ecent studies have indicated that many municipal
issuers are woefully tardy in issuing their annual financial statements, and yet many of these municipalities
continue to issue bonds in the market.... Timeliness is a particular concern. With the appropriate authority,
the Commission could mandate that municipal disclosures be issued in a time period that would make critical
information available when investment decisions are made." Elisse B. Walter, Commissioner, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm'n, Speech by SEC Commissioner: Regulation of the Municipal Securities Market: Investors Are
Not Second-Class Citizens (Oct. 28, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spchl02809ebw.htm; see also Luis A. Aguilar, Commissioner, U.S.
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Speech by SEC Commissioner: Improving Municipal Securities Disclosure: Our
Work Is Not Yet Done (May 26, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speechl2010/spch052610laa-
municipal.htm ("I also remain concerned that Rule 15c2-12 does not address specific disclosure items that are
highly relevant to the issuer's financial health . . . ."). Moreover, FINRA and MSRB have deemed it
necessary to "remind" the municipal securities industry about the continuing disclosure requirements. FIN.
INDUS. REG. AUTH., MUNICIPAL SECURITIES, REG. NOTICE 10-41 (2010), available at
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/ documents/notices/pl22112.pdf, Lynn Hume,
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addition, other commentators and publications have recently highlighted similar
findings. 154  Collectively, this shows that investor protection and disclosure
problems clearly exist within the municipal securities market even if the default risk
is not immediate.
Sparse regulatory enforcement in the municipal securities market has largely
led to the existing regulatory regime providing inadequate investor protection and
disclosure. The sparse regulatory enforcement is evidenced by the low number of
enforcement actions and the SEC's disparate treatment of regulatory
noncompliance in the municipal securities market relative to the corporate securities
market.
The enforcement of disclosure compliance in the municipal securities market
has been limited to basically a few SEC antifraud actions against municipal
securities issuers1 55 and a couple regulatory enforcement actions by FINRA done
annually against brokers, dealers, and underwriters.156 Shockingly, the SEC and the
various bank regulating agencies have rarely ever enforced disclosure compliance
against a broker, dealer, or underwriter using Rule 15c2-12, Rule G-32, or the
MSRB Warns Dealers, Issuers About G-32, G-36 Compliance, BOND BUYER, July 11, 2001,
http://www.bondbuyer.com/news/-140288-1.html.
154. Hamilton, supra note 71, at 1028-29 (arguing that there is a lack of credit transparency in the
municipal securities market); Gretchen Morgenson, A Fog Warning, Again, for Municipal Bonds, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 18, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/business/municipal-bonds-are-sometimes-still-lost-in-the-
fog.html; Andrew Ackerman & Rich Saskal, Disclosure Raised At Hearing, BOND BUYER, Sept. 22, 2010,
http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/I 19 431/muni market disclosure-1017567-Ihtml; Gretchen Morgenson,
Red Flags That Muni Investors Can't See, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/22/business/22gret.html?em; Andrew Ackerman, Discord on Disclosure,
BOND BUYER, Sept. 15, 2008, http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/117_176/-294387-1.html; Lynn Hume,
Tower Under Scrutiny, BOND BUYER, Mar. 7, 2007, http://www.bondbuyer.com/news/-266391-1.html; Joe
Mysak, San Diego Isn't the Only City with Pension Troubles, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 17, 2006, 12:05 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&refer-columnist mysak&sid=aumexv8vt5rc.
155. Recently, there have been only a handful of these enforcement actions. See New Jersey, Securities
Act Release No. 9135, 2010 WL 3260860 (Aug. 18, 2010); San Diego, Cal., Securities Act Release No. 8751,
Exchange Act Release No. 54745, 89 SEC Docket 807 (Nov. 14, 2006); Utah Educ. Savings Plan Trust,
Securities Act Release No. 8601, 85 SEC Docket 3380 (Aug. 4, 2005); Dauphin Cnty. Gen. Auth., Securities
Act Release No. 8415, 82 SEC Docket 2519 (Apr. 26, 2004); Neshannock Twp. Sch. Dist, Securities Act
Release No. 8411, Exchange Act Release No. 49600, 82 SEC Docket 2400 (Apr. 22, 2004); Mass. Tpk. Auth.
and James J. Kerasiotes, Securities Act Release No. 8260, 80 SEC Docket 2081 (July 31, 2003); Miami, Fla.,
Securities Act Release No. 8213, Exchange Act Release No. 47552, 79 SEC Docket 2580 (Mar. 21, 2003);
Miami, Fla., Cesar Odio, and Manohar Surana, Initial Decision Release No. 185, 75 SEC Docket 725 (June
22, 2001).
156. FINRA is by far the most active regulator in the municipal securities market as of late. See Rice
Sec., LLC, FINRA Case No. 2010023765101, 2011 WL 5027719 (Oct. 17, 2011); FMSbonds, Inc., FINRA
Case No. 2009019191401, 2011 WL 2923914 (July 15, 2011); Sw. Sec., FINRA Arbitration Case No. 10-
03221, 2011 WL 1938431 (May 16, 2011); Piper Jaffray & Co., FINRA Case No. 20070071254-01, 2008 WL
4343754 (Aug. 2008); Butler, Wick & Co., FINRA Case No. 2007007328301, 2008 WL 2102203 (May 15,
2008); Fifth Third Sec., Inc., NASD Case No. E8A2005007701, 2007 WL 1452051 (May 15, 2007); Stem
Bros. & Co., NASD Case No. 20060039825-01, 2007 WL 1452051 (May 15, 2007); Stifel, Nicolaus & Co.,
NASD Case No. 20060039884-01, 2007 WL 1452051 (May 15, 2007); Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, NASD Case
No. E072005014801, 2006 WL 2981517 (Oct. 16, 2006); Conners & Co. and Robert Louis Conners, NASD
Case No. E8A2005005401, 2006 WL 2397908 (Aug. 15, 2006); Oppenheimer & Co., NASD Case No.
E102003017701, 2006 WL 689505 (Mar. 15, 2006).
This is problematic because FINRA was created to self-police brokers and dealers, not to be the primary
regulator in the municipal securities market. See supra note 64.
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former Rule G-36.157 Furthermore, no municipal securities regulator has ever
enforced these regulations in court.158 Such few enforcement actions suggest that
the municipal securities market has not historically been a regulatory priority.
Consider the SEC's much-celebrated settlement with the State of New Jersey in
2010.159 This antifraud action was hardly the result of an in-depth investigation.
The fraudulent nondisclosure started in 2001160 and seemingly ended in 2007 as a
result of a New York Times' special report.161
In addition, the SEC's disparate treatment of regulatory noncompliance in the
municipal securities market evidences the sparse regulatory enforcement in this
market. SEC data provided in the figure below shows the depth of the SEC's
neglect.
Figure 1162
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Total Issuer Reporting and Disclosure Enforcement
185 138 219 157 143 126
Actions
Total Municipal Offering Enforcement Actions 4 8 5 2 2 6
This disparate treatment is difficult to rationalize. The SEC has the authority to
enforce compliance in both markets,163 and while there is more trading activity in
157. The Author has thoroughly researched this claim. The SEC's enforcement of Rulc 15c2-12, Rule G-
32, or the former Rule G-36 is essentially limited to Robert J. Bradbury and Dolphin and Bradbury, Inc.,
Exchange Act Release No. 61132, 97 SEC Docket 1230 (Dec. 9, 2009) and Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc.,
Thomas M. Daly, Jr., and Joseph A. Sullivan, Securities Act Release No. 7984, 75 SEC Docket 383,
Exchange Act Release No. 44407, 75 SEC Docket 396 (June 11, 2001). For additional support, see Andrew
Ackerman, Delinquent Disclosure, BOND BUYER, Sept. 3, 2008, http://www.bondbuyer.
com/issues/l17_168/-294051-1.html ("The SEC has never taken action against a broker-dealer for
underwriting the bonds of a[] [municipal securities] issuer that failed to file its annual financial disclosures.").
The Author's only finding of enforcement of Rule 15c2-12, Rule G-32, or the former Rule G-36 by a bank
regulating agency is the Comptroller of the Currency's enforcement in Commerce Capital, Enforcement
Action No. 97-81, 1997 WL 816764 (Dec. 5, 1997).
158. The Author has thoroughly researched this claim.
159. New Jersey, Securities Act Release No. 9135, 2010 WL 3260860 (Aug. 18, 2010).
160. Id. at 1.
161. Mary Williams Walsh, N.J. Pension Fund Endangered by Diverted Billions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4,
2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/04/nyregion/04pension.html.
162. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Select SEC and Market Data Fiscal 2010 at 3 tbl.2 (2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/secstats20l0.pdf; U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Select SEC and Market Data Fiscal
2009 at 3 tbl.2 (2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secstats2009.pdf; U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n,
Select SEC and Market Data Fiscal 2008 at 3 tbl.2 (2008), available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/secstats2008.pdf; U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Select SEC and Market Data Fiscal
2007 at 3 tbl.2 (2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secstats2007.pdf; U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n,
Select SEC and Market Data Fiscal 2006 at 3 tbl.2 (2006), available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/secstats2006.pdf; U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Select SEC and Market Data Fiscal
2005 at 3 tbl.2 (2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/seestats2005.pdf.
This data accurately reflects the disparate treatment because the SEC has recorded all its municipal securities
related enforcement actions in the "municipal offering" category. Consequently, the "issuer reporting and
disclosure" category includes only enforcement actions in the corporate securities markets.
163. See supra note 116.
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corporate securities relative to municipal securities,164 being delisted from a trading
exchange provides an additional incentive for most corporate issuers to comply. 165
Collectively, industry data coupled with recent reports and commentary
indicate that municipal securities investors are not receiving adequate protection
and disclosure. Sparse regulatory enforcement seems to be a significant contributor
to the relaxed regulatory environment that is grossly unacceptable.
IV. LEGAL UNCERTAINTIES
All indications suggest that the SEC and FINRA intend to get more aggressive
in enforcing the municipal securities "backdoor" regulatory regime.166 However, a
164. Trading volume in the municipal securities market is comparable to trading volume in the corporate
bond market. See Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkt. Ass'n, U.S. Bond Markets: Average Daily Trading Volume (July 1,
2011), available at http://www.sifina.org/research/statistics.aspx. However, corporate securities also include
the national securities exchanges, which have a heavy trading volume. See, e.g., Volume Leaders, YAHOO!
FINANCE, http://finance.yahoo.com/actives?e-nq (last visited June 23, 2012) (listing the most actively traded
corporate stocks on the New York Stock Exchange).
165. The municipal securities market trades almost entirely "over-the-counter" through broker-dealers
and inter-dealer transactions. MSRB Glossary, supra note 7, Over-The-Counter Market (OTC). Conversely,
the corporate securities markets include the heavy trading volume from the corporate securities listed on the
national securities exchanges. See COFFEE, JR. & SALE, supra note 7, at 30-35. Corporate securities listed on
the national securities exchanges face possible delisting if they become delinquent in their SEC disclosure
filings. KEVIN C. SMITH, WHAT LATE SEC FILERS NEED TO KNow (2005), available at
http://www.chadboume.com/files/Publication/8c793188-13cd-4b5c-8894-981185b4dl5a/Presentation/
PublicationAttachment/2a46a74c-d333-46a4-991 e-9a3bc2c378tD/WhatLateSECFilersNeedtoKnow
Bloom Law I 02005.pdf.
166. The SEC is increasing its focus on municipal securities by creating new units, by holding field
hearings, and by conducting a multi-state investigation into public pension disclosures. See Lynn Hume &
Joan Quigley, SEC Plans New Office For Munis, BOND BUYER, June 24, 2011, http://www.
bondbuyer.com/issues/1 20 12 1/sec-new-muni-office-l1028176-I.html; Ted Phillips, SEC Probing Rhode
Island Over Bond Deals, BOND BUYER, Feb. 4, 2011, http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/120_24/sec-rhode-
island-1022901-1.html; Mary Williams Walsh, Illinois Plan for Pensions Questioned, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25,
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/26/business/26pension.html; Mary Williams Walsh & Louise Story,
U.S. Inquiry Said to Focus on California Pension Fund, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2011, http://www.
nytimes.com/2011/01/07/business/07sec.html; U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n Release, SEC Sets Field Hearings
on State of Municipal Securities Markets (Sept. 7, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/
2010-164.htm; Mary Williams Walsh, Pension Fraud by New Jersey Is Cited by S.E.C., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/19/business/19muni.html. The SEC's recent report on the municipal
securities market can reasonably be regarded as an attempt to highlight these new efforts. See SEC 2012
MUNICIPAL SECURITIES REPORT, supra note 20.
In addition, SEC staff in the Division of Enforcement have voiced a desire to increase municipal securities
enforcement. Elaine C. Greenberg, Chief of the Mun. Sec. & Pub. Pension Unit, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n,
Speech by SEC Staff: Remarks at News Conference Announcing New SEC Leaders in Enforcement Division
(Jan. 13, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch0l1310newsconf.htm#greenberg
("[D]espite the size and complexity of [the municipal securities] market, it is thinly regulated.... [O]ne of the
most effective ways to police this market has been through an enhanced enforcement response."); Robert
Khuzami, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Speech by SEC Staff: Remarks Before the
New York City Bar: My First 100 Days as Director of Enforcement (Aug. 5, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch080509rk.htm ("A number of areas [in the municipal securities
market] appear ripe for scrutiny . . . .").
Lastly, FINRA has also expressed similar regulatory concerns and has announced two investigative
"sweeps" focused on retail municipal securities transactions and municipal underwritings that involved
derivative instruments. Lynn Hume, FINRA Chief Warns of Enforcement Action, BOND BUYER, Mar. 7,
2011, http://www.bondbuyer.com/news/finraenforcement-1024122-1.html; Andrew Ackerman, MSRB,
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significant impediment to regulators is the legal uncertainty surrounding this
regime. This uncertainty exists largely because Rule 15c2-12, Rule G-32, and the
former Rule G-36 have never been litigated in court.167 An increase in enforcement
actions would strengthen the likelihood a litigant invokes these regulations in court.
Considering that the Tower Amendment places broad limitations on the SEC and
MSRB, a significant yet unlitigated issue is the legal validity of Rules 15c2-12 and
G-32.
Legal commentators, industry participants, and even regulatory officials have
long questioned the legal validity of the municipal securities "backdoor" regulatory
regime.168 In particular, the 1994 expansion of Rule 15c2-12 sparked strong
criticism that the SEC's implementation of continuing disclosure requirements
against brokers, dealers, and underwriters crossed the line that the Tower
Amendment drew and was therefore legally invalid.169 The legal arguments
attacking the validity of the continuing disclosure requirements are plausible;
however, this Article highlights the legal uncertainty in regulating primary market
issuances. This Article emphasizes this argument because this is the stronger
argument for invalidating "backdoor" regulation since the Tower Amendment is
significantly more restrictive towards primary market regulation relative to
secondary market regulation.170
Specifically, this Article argues that the Chevron test renders the primary
market regulation outlined in Rules 15c2-12 and G-32 invalid because these
regulations operate in tandem to create primary market regulation that the Tower
Amendment expressly prohibits. Section A outlines this argument that the
regulations are invalid pursuant to the Chevron test, and then Section B rebuts the
SEC's arguments defending these regulations in light of the Tower Amendment.
FINRA Remind Dealers of Obligations in Secondary, BOND BUYER, Sept. 21, 2010,
http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/119_430/msrb-finra dealer_obligation-1017498-1.html; Targeted
Examination Request, Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth., Retail Municipal Securities Transactions (June 2009), available
at http://www.finra.org/Industry/Regulation/Guidance/TargetedExaminationLetters/Pl 18892; Targeted
Examination Request, Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth., Municipal Underwritings and Municipal Derivative Instruments
(May 2009), available at http://www.finra.org/Industry/Regulation/Guidance/
Targeted ExaminationLetters/P 119050.
167. See supra pp. 25-26 and accompanying notes.
168. See Laughman, supra note 69, at 1200 (concluding that the SEC's expansion of Rule 15c2-12 in
1994 was "a result not intended by Congress . . . ."); Kiernan, Jr., supra note 67, at 708 ("The argument that
SEC Rule 15c2-12 and [former] MSRB Rule G-36 are invalid because of the Tower Amendment is not
frivolous."); Lynn Hume, SEC's New Muni Initiative, BOND BUYER, Mar. 6, 2007,
http://www.bondbuyer.com/news/-266335-i.html (quote from former SEC Chairman Christopher Cox) ("As
you know there's been concern that Rule 15c2-12, as it exists, might encroach on the Tower Amendment
already."); SEC Disclosure Rules Can Be Legally Challenged, Some Say, BOND BUYER, Apr. 17, 1995,
http://www.bondbuyer.com/news/-47429-1.html (quoting several bond lawyers that argue the 1994 expansion
of Rule 15c2-12 could be invalid because of the Tower Amendment). For an overview of the municipal
securities "backdoor" regulatory regime, see supra Part II.
169. See generally Laughman, supra note 69; SEC Disclosure Rules Can Be Legally Challenged, Some
Say, BOND BUYER, Apr. 17, 1995, http://www.bondbuyer.com/news/-47429-1.html.
170. For a discussion of how the Tower Amendment limits the SEC and MSRB in primary market
regulation, see supra pp. 14-15 and infra pp. 30-31.
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A. Primary Market Regulation, Tower Amendment, and Chevron
The Tower Amendment contains plain language that broadly limits the
regulation of municipal securities issuances. Applying the Chevron test, this
Article finds that the primary market regulation outlined in Rules 15c2-12 and G-32
is contrary to the Tower Amendment and therefore these regulations would likely
be invalidated by a court.
Courts often apply the Chevron test if litigation invokes judicial review of
whether a regulation conforms to an agency's enabling statute.17 1  Thus, the
Chevron test is routinely applied by a court when a litigant requests that a court
enforce an agency's regulation.172 Courts will apply the Chevron test when two
elements are established. First, the court must be reviewing an agency's regulatory
"construction" of its enabling statute. 173 Second, that agency's "construction" must
carry the "force of law."1 74 Therefore, if a municipal securities regulator sought to
enforce Rules 15c2-12 or G-32 in court, then the application of the Chevron test
should determine whether the primary market regulation outlined in these rules is
legally valid. The first element would be established because this litigation would
rely on judicial review of whether Rules 15c2-12 and G-32 are lawfully constructed
pursuant to the 1934 Act. Rules 15c2-12 and G-32 were promulgated by the SEC
pursuant to provisions in the 1934 Act;175 therefore, the enabling statute in this
litigation would be the 1934 Act. The Tower Amendment must be considered in
this review because it is codified in the 1934 Act. The second element would be
established because the SEC promulgated Rules 15c2-12 and G-32 through notice
and comment rulemaking,177 which satisfies the "force of law" requirement." 8
If the Chevron test controls, then courts apply a two-part inquiry to determine
whether the regulations are lawfully constructed pursuant to the agency's enabling
statute. 179 First, the court analyzes whether Congress has directly spoken to the
"precise question at issue."I80 If Congress has unambiguously spoken to the issue
and its intent is clear, then Congress's statute should invalidate the agency's
conflicting regulation thereby ending the Chevron test inquiry. 1 However, if
171. A regulation that is invalid pursuant to the Chevron test cannot be enforced in court because "[t]he
judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject administrative constmuctions
which are contrary to clear congressional intent." Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984).
172. For an overview of the Chevron test and a description of its application, see Kristine C. Kamezis,
Annotation, Construction and Application of "Chevron Deference" to Administrative Action by United States
Supreme Court, 3 A.L.R. FED. 2d. 25 (2005).
173. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
174. U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).
175. See supra note 87.
176. See supra pp. 13-15 and accompanying notes.
177. See supra notes 88, 99 and accompanying text
178. See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 226-27.
179. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842 ("When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute that it
administers, it is confronted with two questions.").
180. Id. at 842.
181. Id.at842-43.
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Congress has not unambiguously spoken to the precise question at issue, then the
inquiry should continue with the court next determining whether Congress
"explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill."1 82 If so, then the regulation is upheld
under this second inquiry unless the regulation is "arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute."183  The Chevron test embodies the principle of
judicial deference to agency regulations;184 hence, the test is often referred to as
"Chevron deference."
185
The primary market regulation outlined in Rules 15c2-12 and G-32 could be
legally invalid under the first inquiry of the Chevron test because the Tower
Amendment speaks to the "precise question at issue" by expressly prohibiting the
SEC and MSRB from requiring filings obtained from the issuer prior to a primary
market issuance. The Tower Amendment's first provision pertains to primary
market issuances and it states:
Neither the Commission nor the Board is authorized under this title, by rule or
regulation, to require any issuer of municipal securities, directly or indirectly
through a purchaser or prospective purchaser of securities from the issuer, to file
with the Commission or the Board prior to the sale of such securities by the issuer
any application, report, or document in connection with the issuance, sale, or
distribution of such securities.186
The terms "Commission" and "Board" are, respectively, shorthand for the SEC
and MSRB. 187  Moreover, the phrase "purchaser or prospective purchaser of
securities from the issuer" matches the statutory definition of an underwriter.188
Also, the phrase "prior to the sale" could reasonably be construed as applying the
182. Id. at 843-44.
183. Household Credit Serv., Inc. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 239 (2004); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44.
Some courts and commentators appropriately articulate the Chevron test's second inquiry with a slight
variation, which states "if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for
the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute." Chevron, 467
U.S. at 843. Here, this is not the appropriate standard to apply because Congress has clearly not been silent or
ambiguous towards municipal securities regulation since Congress enacted the Tower Amendment in 1975.
Regardless, most commentators distill the Chevron test's second inquiry to be whether the agency's regulation
is "reasonable" no matter how the standard is specifically articulated. See STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 328 (6th ed. 2006).
184. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 ("We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to
an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the principle of
deference to administrative interpretations.").
185. The term "Chevron deference" is frequently used when articulating the Chevron test. See generally
Kamezis, supra note 172.
186. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15B(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(d)(1) (2006).
187. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(15), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(15) (2006) (defining "Commission"
as the SEC); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15B(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(e)(1) (Supp. IV 2010) (defining
"Board" as the MSRB for the purposes of section 15B of the 1934 Act).
188. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(20) (defining "underwriter" as having the same meaning as in the Investment
Advisors Act of 1940); Investment Advisors Act of 1940 § 202(a)(20), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(20) (2006)
("'Underwriter' means any person who has purchased from an issuer with a view to, or sells for an issuer in
connection with, the distribution of any security, or participates or has a direct or indirect participation in any
such undertaking . . . ."). Even the SEC acknowledges that the phrase "purchaser or prospective purchaser of
securities from the issuer" is referring to underwriters. SEC 2007 MUNICIPAL SECURITIES WHITE PAPER,
supra note 82, at 3 n.12.
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provision's limitation to the primary market time period.189 Finally, the terms
"application," "report," or "document" could reasonably be construed to include the
official statement even though the 1934 Act does not specifically define these
terms. 190  Therefore, a reasonable interpretation is that the Tower Amendment's
first provision expressly prohibits the SEC and MSRB from requiring an
underwriter to file with the SEC or MSRB an official statement obtained from the
issuer prior to a primary market issuance.
Consequently, the Tower Amendment's first provision likely invalidates the
primary market regulation outlined in Rules 15c2-12 and G-32 because these
regulations operate in tandem to require that an underwriter file with the MSRB an
official statement obtained from the issuer prior to a primary market issuance.
First, Rule 15c2-12 requires that the underwriter "obtain and review an official
statement" from the issuer prior to the issuance of municipal securities.191 Second,
Rule G-32 states that "the underwriter of a primary offering of municipal securities
shall submit the official statement for such offering to [MSRB's] EMMA ... no
later than the closing date."' 92 The "closing date" is the date of the primary market
issuance. 193  Therefore, these regulations could conflict with the Tower
Amendment's first provision.
The legal obstacle in invalidating these regulations is that the analysis must rely
on the collective effect of Rules 15c2-12 and G-32 to find a conflict with the Tower
Amendment. The SEC has carefully tailored both regulations so that if each is
considered individually, then the primary market regulation survives such scrutiny.
Rule 15c2-12's requirement that the underwriter "obtain and review" the official
statement is not necessarily in conflict with the Tower Amendment because the
regulation does not by itself mandate a filing with the SEC or MSRB. Moreover,
Rule G-32's requirement that the underwriter file the official statement with
MSRB's EMMA is not necessarily in conflict with the Tower Amendment because
the regulation does not by itself mandate that the issuer provide an official
statement to the underwriter.
However, this Article finds that this legal obstacle can be overcome for two
reasons. This Article highlights these two specific reasons, and then outlines the
Supreme Court's emphasis on plain language and congressional intent when
189. The phrase "prior to the sale" is not rigidly defined by the 1934 Act. See Securities Exchange Act of
1934 § 3(a)(14), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14) (2006) ("The terms 'sale' and 'sell' each include any contract to sell
or otherwise dispose of"). The primary market is the market where new issues of municipal securities are
initially sold by issuers to investors typically with an underwriter acting as an intermediary. MSRB
GLOSSARY, supra note 7, Primary Market, New Issue Municipal Securities; see also supra p. 8.
190. This is a reasonable interpretation because Rule 15c2-12 defines "final official statement" as a
"document or set of documents prepared by an issuer of municipal securities or its representatives . . . ." SEC
Municipal Securities Disclosure Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(f(3) (2011) (emphasis added).
191. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(b)(1) ("Prior to the time the Participating Underwriter bids for, purchases,
offers, or sells municipal securities in an Offering, the Participating Underwriter shall obtain and review an
official statement that an issuer of such securities deems final as of its date .. . .").
192. MSRB Disclosures in Connection with Primary Offerings, Mun. Sec. Rulemaking Bd. Rule G-
32(b)(i)(B)(1) (2011).
193. Mun. Sec. Rulemaking Bd. Rule G-32(d)(ii) ("The term 'closing date' shall mean the date of first
delivery by the issuer to or through the underwriter of municipal securities sold in a primary offering."); see
also TEMEL, supra note 7, at 242.
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applying the Chevron test. Collectively, these arguments support invalidating the
primary market regulation outlined in Rules 15c2-12 and G-32.
The Chevron test can invalidate two regulations that operate in tandem to
conflict with an enabling statute if those regulations were promulgated by the same
agency and "constructed" from the same enabling statute. 194  Here, the SEC
promulgated Rules 15c-12 and G-32 as effective "constructions" of the 1934
Act.195 Rule 15c2-12 was initially proposed and promulgated by the SEC.196 Rule
G-32 was initially proposed by the MSRB,197 but the regulation only became law
because the SEC promulgated the regulation through its rulemaking process. The
1934 Act recognizes that the MSRB may "propose and adopt" regulations, but that
these regulations will only "take effect" if approved by the SEC.198 This distinction
is important because the Chevron test is applied to regulations that carry the "force
of law"l 99 and Rule G-32 only assumed the "force of law" after the SEC
promulgated it through notice and comment rulemaking. Therefore, it is the SEC
that truly "constructed" Rule G-32 pursuant to the 1934 Act even though the text of
the Tower Amendment distinguishes between SEC and MSRB regulations. Thus,
the Chevron test can be applied considering whether the collective effect of these
regulations conflicts with the 1934 Act's Tower Amendment because both
regulations were promulgated by the SEC pursuant to the 1934 Act.
In addition, in the past, the Supreme Court has applied the Chevron test to
invalidate multiple regulations that conflict with an enabling statute if the text of
those regulations indicates that they were intended to operate in tandem.200 Here,
the text of Rules 15c2-12 and G-32 indicates that they were intended to operate in
tandem. Rule 15c2-12 requircs the underwriter to contract with the issuer to receive
"copies of a final official statement in sufficient quantity to comply with ... the
rules of the [MSRB]." 201 This is an explicit textual reference to Rule G-32, which
requires the underwriter to submit the official statement to MSRB's EMMA prior to
the primary market issuance. Moreover, Rule G-32 explains that its filing
requirement shall not apply "[i]f an official statement will not be prepared for a
primary offering of municipal securities exempt from . .. Rule 15c2-12." 202 Thus,
194. Chevron states specifically that it applies to an agency's "construction of the statute which it
administers." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
195. See supra note 87.
196. See supra pp. 15-16 and accompanying notes.
197. See supra pp. 16-17 and accompanying notes.
198. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15B(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(b)(2) (2006) (providing authority
to the MSRB to propose and adopt regulations); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §19(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. §
78s(b)(1) (2006) (providing that a regulation proposed or adopted by the MSRB will not take effect unless
approved by the SEC). See also supra p. 13 and accompanying notes (discussing the regulatory limitations
placed upon the MSRB).
199. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
200. See Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 524-26, 541 (1990) (holding that a test for determining
qualification for Social Security Income that was enacted through multiple regulatory provisions operating in
tandem is invalid pursuant to the Chevron test); Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin.
Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 368 (1986) (holding that regulatory provisions operating in tandem to alter the definition
of "bank" to conflict with the statutory definition of "bank" are invalid).
201. SEC Municipal Securities Disclosure Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(b)(3) (2011).
202. MSRB Disclosures in Connection with Primary Offerings, Mun. Sec. Rulemaking Bd. Rule G-
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this text makes Rules 15c2-12 and G-32 operate in tandem because the provision is
exempting Rule G-32's filing requirement for those issuances already exempt from
Rule 15c2-12's "obtain and review" requirement. Therefore, the text in Rules
15c2-12 and G-32 indicates that these regulations were intended to operate in
tandem. As a result, the Chevron test can be applied to invalidate the primary
market regulation outlined in Rules 15c2-12 and G-32.
The Supreme Court's emphasis on plain language and congressional intent in
the application of the Chevron test also supports invalidating the primary market
regulation outlined in Rules 15c2-12 and G-32. Supreme Court case law
overwhelmingly stresses that Chevron deference is only owed to agency regulations
that are consistent with the enabling statute's plain language. 203 Here, the Tower
Amendment's plain language expresses a broad limitation that a court could
reasonably conclude forbids the primary market regulation outlined in Rules 15c2-
12 and G-32.204 Moreover, Supreme Court case law also stresses that Chevron
deference is not owed to regulations that are inconsistent with congressional
intent.205 Clearly, the collective effect of Rules 15c2-12 and G-32 violates the
Tower Amendment's congressional intent as articulated in the Senate floor debate:
With respect to the authority of the [MSRB], the [Tower
Amendment] would simply clarify the position the Committee
articulated in its report, namely that the bill is not intended to tamper
in any way with prerogatives of State and local governments in their
sale of securities. The [Tower Amendment] thus states that the
[MSRB] may not impose on issuers, directly or indirectly, disclosure
requirements. Surely there can be no argument with that result.206
Thus, the Tower Amendment's plain language and congressional intent support
32(b)(i)(C) (2011).
203. See generally Kamezis, supra note 172, § 12 (listing numerous Supreme Court cases that stress
Chevron deference is only owed to agency regulations that are consistent with the enabling statute's plain
language).
204. See supra pp. 30-31 and accompanying notes.
205. See generally Kamezis, supra note 172, § 13 (listing numerous Supreme Court cases that stress
Chevron deference is not owed to regulations that are inconsistent with congressional intent).
206. 121 CONG. REC. 10,736 (1975) (statement of Sen. Harrison Williams, Jr.). Senator Williams also
stated that "the [Tower Amendment] would make clear that the [MSRB] created by the bill would not have
authority to require State and local governments to make disclosures about their operations." Id.
Albeit stated less pointedly, Senator Tower added:
[The Tower Amendment would] clarify the role between issuers of municipal securities and the newly
proposed [MSRB]. Under the [Tower Amendment], the [MSRB] would not have authority to require State
and local government units to provide information about their operations. Much of this information will
undoubtedly be made available in any case. Furthermore, the [MSRB] can obtain such information from
municipal securities brokers and dealers, who already supply such information to investors. The [Tower
Amendment] is designed to make it clear that the bill will not be a means of subjecting States, cities,
counties, or villages to any unnecessary disclosure requirements which could be promulgated by the new
[MSRB].
Id. at 10,737 (emphasis added).
Regardless, the Tower Amendment's congressional intent conflicts with the primary market disclosure that
is required by Rules 15c2-12 and G-32 operating in tandem. For additional analysis of the Tower
Amendment's congressional intent, see Kiernan, Jr., supra note 67, at 707 (arguing that Rule 15c2-12 and the
former Rule G-36 are contrary to the "spirit of the Tower Amendment" because the regulations require
"precisely what the Tower Amendment aimed to prevent") (emphasis added).
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invalidating the primary market regulation outlined in Rules 15c2-12 and G-32.
Finally, it should be acknowledged that this statutory conflict has existed since
1990. Rule 15c2-12 was promulgated to regulate primary market issuances in 1989
and the filing requirement in Rule G-32 was first promulgated by the SEC as Rule
G-36 in 1990.207 However, the longstanding nature of this conflict should not
influence whether a court finds that these regulations are legally valid. The
Supreme Court has held that longstanding regulations are not entitled to Chevron
deference if the regulations conflict with the plain language of the statute.208 Also,
practitioners should not be dissuaded by this longstanding conflict. Collectively,
there has been little motivation to challenge this primary market regulatory regime
because there has been sparse regulatory enforcement209 and investors have been
210
subject to relatively few defaults. Of course, these motivations could change
quickly if there is an increase in enforcement actions or an increase in defaults.211
Overall, the Tower Amendment's first provision expresses broad limitations
that a court could reasonably conclude invalidates the primary market regulation
outlined in Rules 15c2-12 and G-32.
B. SEC's Arguments
This Section rebuts the SEC's arguments defending Rules 15c2-12 and G-32 in
light of the Tower Amendment. This Section outlines each SEC argument
independently, and then analyzes the persuasiveness of each argument. This
Section finds that a court is unlikely to be swayed by the SEC's arguments
defending Rules 15c2-12 and G-32.
The SEC's argument in defense of the primary market regulation outlined in
207. See supra pp. 15-16 and accompanying notes.
208. See, e.g., Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 122 (1994) ("A regulation's age is no antidote to clear
inconsistency with a statute, and the fact, again, that [the regulation] flies against the plain language of the
statutory text exempts courts from any obligation to defer to it."); Pub. Emp. Ret. Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492
U.S. 158, 171 (1989) ("But, of course, no [Chevron] deference is due to agency interpretations at odds with
the plain language of the statute itself. Even contemporaneous and longstanding agency interpretations must
fall to the extent they conflict with statutory language."). But cf Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v.
Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 846 (1986) ("It is well established that when Congress revisits a statute giving rise to a
longstanding administrative interpretation without pertinent change, the congressional failure to revise or
repeal the agency's interpretation is persuasive evidence that the interpretation is the one intended by
Congress.") (internal quotations omitted).
209. See supra pp. 25-27 and accompanying notes. In addition, some industry participants speculate
municipal securities issuers will never litigate the backdoor regime because "the legal battle would be long
and costly and difficult to justify to taxpayers." SEC Disclosure Rules Can Be Legally Challenged, Some Say,
BOND BUYER, Apr. 17, 1995, http://www.bondbuyer.com/news/-47429-1.html. The SEC has also come
under heavy criticism as of late for reaching settlements instead of pursuing litigation. Unsettling Wall Street,
ECONOMIST, Dec. 3, 2011, at 89, available at http://www.economist.com/node/21541055.
210. Municipal securities investors have had little motivation to litigate against issuers or underwriters
over the disclosure regulations because investors have generally always received their principal and interest
payments since there have been relatively few defaults in the municipal securities market to date. See
generally MOODY'S DEFAULT REPORT, supra note 30 (outlining that only fifty-four Moody's-rated municipal
bonds have defaulted since 1970).
211. See supra Part Ill (discussing the need for more municipal securities enforcement actions and the
likelihood of an increase in municipal securities defaults).
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Rule 15c2-12 is as follows:
While Congress limited the power of the MSRB to require that
disclosure documents be provided to investors, it was careful to
preserve and expand the authority of the Commission under section
15(c)(2) of the [1934] Act. Section 15B(d)(2) expressly indicates that
"[n]othing in this paragraph shall be construed to impair or limit the
power of the Commission under any provision of this title." Thus,
although section 15B(d)(1) prevents the Commission from requiring
that municipal issuers file reports or documents prior to the issuance
of securities in the same fashion as corporate securities, Congress
expanded the Commission's authority to adopt rules reasonably
designed to prevent fraud, so long as the rules did not require
documents to be filed with the Commission. The Commission
believes that Rule 15c2-12 is consistent with its Congressional
mandate to adopt rules reasonably designed to prevent fraud in the
federal securities markets. 212
This argument is unpersuasive for two main reasons. First, it relies on a clause
in section 15B(d)(2) of the 1934 Act (the Tower Amendment's second provision) to
justify the primary market regulation outlined in section 15B(d)(1) (the Tower
Amendment's first provision). A court could reasonably conclude that the clause,
"nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to impair or limit the power of the
[SEC] under any provision of this title," is only a limitation affecting the
"paragraph" defined as section 15B(d)(2). This is the more likely interpretation
because section 15B(d)(2) is noteworthy for mysteriously not applying to the
SEC;213 therefore, it would seem relevant to clarify that nothing in section
15B(d)(2) should be applied to limit the SEC's other powers as provided elsewhere
in the 1934 Act. Second, while the SEC is correct to assert its authority in section
21415(c)(2), this provision cannot be applied in a manner that renders meaningless
all other provisions within the 1934 Act.215 Thus, while the SEC can generally
promulgate rules designed to prevent fraud by brokers and dealers pursuant to
section 15(c)(2), it cannot, in that process, violate other specific statutory
restrictions on its authority such as the Tower Amendment. Finally, it also
noteworthy that the SEC's argument does not acknowledge the Tower
Amendment's broad limitation on "indirect" regulation, which is the plain language
that most specifically conflicts with the primary market regulation outlined in Rule
15c2-12. Overall, this argument is plausible, but unlikely to sway a court.
The SEC's argument in defense of the primary market filing requirement now
outlined in Rule G-32 is as follows:
212. Municipal Securities Disclosure, 53 Fed. Reg. 37,778, 37,787 (Sept. 28, 1988) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
pt. 240).
213. See supra p. 15 and note 85.
214. See supra p. I5 and note 87.
215. TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) ("It is a cardinal principle of statutory construction
that a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or
word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.") (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Duncan v.
Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)).
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Rule 15c2-12 was a lawfully promulgated Commission rule that
addresses regulatory concerns pertaining to the obligations of
underwriters to obtain [official statements] and provide them to the
public pursuant to a Commission rule, it would strain the language of
the Tower Amendment to suggest that that provision prevents the
MSRB from promulgating a separate rule requiring underwriters to
make a copy of the [official statements] available to the Board. Rule
G-36 imposes no additional requirement, directly or indirectly, on
issuers. Thus, the Commission believes that rule G-36 is not in
conflict with the delicate balance Congress sought to achieve in
section 15B between the need to grant the Board authority to carry
out the important investor protection objectives of the Act and the
concerns over comity among various levels of government.216
This argument is unpersuasive for three main reasons. First, this argument
ignores the plain language in the Tower Amendment that outlines that the SEC and
MSRB cannot require that an underwriter file with the MSRB an official statement
obtained from the issuer prior to a primary market issuance.2 17 Thus, there is a
"strain on the language of the Tower Amendment" when the SEC adopts an MSRB
regulation requiring that such a filing be made with the MSRB. Second, this
argument relies on a very peculiar definition of "indirectly." A court would likely
conclude that requiring the issuer's underwriter to file the official statement does
indirectly impose additional requirements on the issuer, particularly when Rule
15c2-12 requires that the underwriter "obtain and review" that official statement
from the issuer. Finally, the argument essentially states that no additional
requirement is created by mandating that a "copy" of the official statement be filed.
A more reasonable argument is that an additional requirement is created when an
additional filing is mandated, regardless of whether that filing must be an original
document or a copy. Overall, this argument is unlikely to sway a court.
The SEC has a recent history of promulgating regulations that go beyond its
statutory authority. This Section finds that the SEC has likely again gone beyond
its authority. A strong argument exists that the primary market regulation outlined
in Rules 15c2-12 and G-32 conflicts with the Tower Amendment's broad
limitations. Therefore, if these regulations were enforced in court, then it is likely
that a court would invalidate these regulations pursuant to the Chevron test.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The relaxed regulatory environment in the municipal securities market must be
reevaluated because the market no longer resembles its reputation as a "sleepy
216. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Delivery of Official Statements and
Recordkeeping, 55 Fed. Reg. 23,333, 23,337 (June 7, 1990). The filing requirement in Rule G-32 was first
promulgated by the SEC as Rule G-36 in 1990. See supra p. 16 and accompanying notes.
217. See supra Part IV.A.
218. See, e.g., Fin. Planning Ass'n v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 482 F.3d 481 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Goldstein v.
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Teicher v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 177 F.3d 1016
(D.C. Cir. 1999).
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market." An impending regulatory crisis exists in the municipal securities market
for several related reasons. Investors face growing default risk as state and local
governments face increasing financial stresses.219 Also, there is inadequate
financial disclosure largely as a result of sparse regulatory enforcement.220
Moreover, if the existing regulatory regime were to be enforced in court, then
judicial review would likely render the primary market disclosure requirements
invalid.221 Collectively, these concerns largely incriminate the Tower Amendment.
This Article proposes two recommendations to help begin correcting the
unacceptable existing state of municipal securities regulation.
First, regulators must increase their focus on the municipal securities market.
Unequivocally, regulators must start meaningfully enforcing compliance with Rules
15c2-12 and G-32.222 In addition, regulators must be more active in using their
broad antifraud authority.223 The investor protection and disclosure principles
underpinning securities regulation224 lend support to increasing regulatory
enforcement considering that the municipal securities market now involves more
issuances and trading, larger retail investor participation, and greater use of
complex and sophisticated instruments.225 Moreover, the municipal securities
market exists to implement important public interest projects;226 therefore,
maintaining market integrity should be of the utmost importance.
There have been recent developments that demonstrate that regulators are
increasing their focus on municipal securities. The creation of EMMA as a free,
online, centralized repository for obtaining municipal securities disclosure is a
positive development for investors.227 Also, the SEC's investigation into public
pension disclosures shows that the SEC is taking notice.228 Lastly, the Dodd-Frank
Act's amendment to the 1934 Act that allows the MSRB to be more active in
municipal securities enforcement will perhaps be a long-term improvement in
municipal securities regulation.229 However, the immediacy of this regulatory
crisis demands that more attention be paid. In addition, the existing legal
uncertainties surrounding primary market enforcement complicates matters.
Therefore, secondly, Congress should improve the statutory authority for
municipal securities regulatory enforcement so that primary market disclosure can
be lawfully compelled by regulators.230 The necessary reforms to primary market
219. See supra pp. 22-24 and accompanying notes.
220. See supra pp. 24-27 and accompanying notes.
221. See supra Part IV.
222. See supra pp. 24-27 and accompanying notes (outlining the rampant noncompliance with disclosure
requirements and the sparse regulatory enforcement that exists in the municipal securities market).
223. See supra pp. 11-12 and accompanying notes (outlining the SEC's broad antifraud authority).
224. See supra pp. 21-22 and accompanying notes.
225. See supra pp. 1-2 and accompanying notes.
226. See supra p. 2 and accompanying notes.
227. See supra p. 19 and accompanying notes.
228. See supra note 166.
229. See supra p. 20 and note 122.
230. See supra Part IV (outlining an argument that primary market municipal securities disclosure cannot
currently be compelled in court because the Chevron test would render the regulations invalid and
unenforceable). The SEC did not include this in its most recent recommendations for improving municipal
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disclosure could even be accomplished by maintaining the "backdoor" regulatory
framework, but the Tower Amendment's first provision codified at section
15B(d)(1) of the 1934 Act must be revised. Thus, a successful revision would
make clear that the SEC and MSRB can require an underwriter to file with MSRB's
EMMA an official statement obtained from the issuer prior to a primary market
issuance. This revision could be accomplished by simply deleting one reference to
the MSRB. A revised section 15B(d)(1) would state:
Neither the Commission nor the Board is authorized under this title,
by rule or regulation, to require any issuer of municipal securities,
directly or indirectly through a purchaser or prospective purchaser of
securities from the issuer, to file with the Commission [delete: or the
Board] prior to the sale of such securities by the issuer any
application, report, or document in connection with the issuance,
sale, or distribution of such securities.
Alternatively, affirmative language could replace the existing section 15B(d)(1) to
make this proposed revision unambiguous. This statutory revision would state:
The SEC and MSRB may, by rule or regulation, require any issuer of
municipal securities indirectly through a purchaser or prospective
purchase of securities from the issuer, to file with the MSRB prior to
the sale of such securities by the issuer any official statement in
connection with the issuance, sale, or distribution of such securities.
Either of these revisions would provide the necessary reform and avoid the
contentious issue of whether the Tower Amendment should be fully repealed. 231
These recommendations should be welcomed by all participants in the
municipal securities market. Recently, investors have withdrawn funds from the
municipal securities market232 even though defaults have not increased to the
alarming levels predicted by the market critics.233 Increased enforcement efforts
could bolster investor confidence and help lower borrowing rates for issuers.234
Brokers, dealers, and underwriters never welcome increased enforcement, but they
should prefer this option to other proposed alternatives.235 For example, repealing
the Tower Amendment and implementing issuer-based regulation could easily
securities disclosure. See SEC 2012 MUNICIPAL SECURITIES REPORT, supra note 20, at 134-39.
231. See Andrew Ackerman, SEC Looks to Target Tower Amendment, BOND BUYER, May 13, 2009,
http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/l18 91/-303354-i.html (discussing the opposition to repealing the Tower
Amendment); Joe Mysak, U.S. Muni Issuers Prepare to Debate Tower Amendment, BLOOMBERG (May 2,
2007, 2:35 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&refer-bondheads&
sid=aMmldddQjwol (outlining why some market participants oppose repealing the Tower Amendment).
232. Christopher Condon, U.S. Muni-Bond Funds Had 5.75 Billion in Net Withdrawals in Past Week,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 26, 2011, 11:53 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-26/u-s-muni-funds-lose-
5-75-billion-in-1l th-consecutive-week-of-withdrawals.html.
233. Charles Gasparino, Is Meredith Whitney Flip-Flopping or Stalling?, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 21,
2011, 3:28 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/charles-gasparino/is-meredith-whitney-flipf b_
838612.html.
234. Id. ("Because of the panic selling, small investors ... got hit the hardest, unless of course you count
the nation's taxpayers who are now forced to pay higher interest rates when the cities and states they live in
need [to] issue debt.").
235. SEC Commissioner Elisse B. Walter has proposed implementing issuer-based regulation in the
municipal securities market. See supra note 20.
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affect their profits by decreasing the market's issuing and trading activity. Broker,
dealers, and underwriters might respond to increased enforcement with increased
fees, but these fee increases would likely cost issuers less than the increased costs
associated with issuer-based regulation. 236
Unfortunately, these recommendations will likely not be realized in the current
political climate.237 In the meantime, we can only hope that our government will
heed to this "call for action" and help curtail an impending regulatory crisis that
seems but a matter of time.
236. Issuer-based regulation would likely increase an issuer's regulatory costs because it would impose
new expenses on the issuer. It is likely that increased expenses would stem from new accounting mandates
and additional legal burdens. It is likely that there would then be fewer issuances as a result of these increased
costs. Over time there would then be less trading activity because there would be fewer municipal securities
outstanding. Brokers, dealers, and underwriters make profits by charging fees on issuances and trades.
237. The SEC has limited capacity to increase its focus on the municipal securities market because it is
increasingly burdened, yet under-funded. See James B. Stewart, As a Watchdog Starves, Wall Street is Tossed
a Bone, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/16/business/budget-cuts-to-sec-reduce-
its-effectiveness.html; Ben Protess, S.E.C Chief Makes Plea for Bigger Budget, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Mar.
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